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 My thesis explores the impact of underclass ideology and the budding neoliberal  
consensus on black censorship efforts against gangsta rap music in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
While there are a few scholarly works that focus on blacks’ involvement in the gangsta rap 
censorship movement, they fail to provide any serious inquiry into their ideological motivations 
for pursuing censorship. In an effort to fill this gap, my thesis looks at underclass ideology and 
neoliberalism in relation to two groups that were active in the gangsta rap censorship movement: 
black liberals and the Nation of Islam (NOI).  
I argue that censors took issue with the genre because they saw it as promoting social 
pathology among African Americans. During the 1990s, crime, violence, broken families, and a 
host of other social issues had become synonymous with African-American communities in 
American politics and culture, and black censors felt that limiting black people’s access to 
gangsta rap could ameliorate these issues. Censors felt an urgent need to suppress gangsta rap, as 
the Clinton administration used the type of black stereotypes promoted in the genre to justify 
taking a hardline approach to black criminality and cutting off welfare for black families. Like 
others swept into the orbit of underclass ideology and neoliberalism, black censors shared two 
widely-held assumptions about African Americans that informed their critiques of the genre: 
one, that they exhibited pathological behavior; and two, that black social pathologies could be 
ameliorated by pursuing measures that would curtail antisocial behavior. 
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 In 1977, Time magazine published an article that discussed the burgeoning American 
underclass. Bypassing any mention of the role that deindustrialization, automation, and public 
policy played in its development, the article described the underclass strictly in terms of race and 
social pathology: it was mainly comprised of poor urban blacks who tended to be welfare 
recipients, juvenile delinquents, drug users, and adult-aged criminals. Despite civil rights gains, 
an expansion of affirmative action and antipoverty programs, steady job growth, and a growing 
black middle class, the underclass proved unable to take advantage of these opportunities, the 
article continued, because it suffered from “psychological and material destitution” that was 
most likely the result of institutional racism. The article then proposed several solutions to the 
issues facing the underclass, like supporting harsh punishments for criminal offenders and 
endorsing President Jimmy Carter’s “‘profamily, pro-work’” welfare reform bill, which would 
be used to combat dependency and family dissolution among its members.1 With its analysis, the 
article anticipated many of the characterizations of and policies for the underclass that former 
president Ronald Raegan would make popular during his presidency.  
 At first glance, it seems that this detailed description of the underclass has little, if 
anything to do with music censorship. However, the underclass served as a major impetus behind 
black involvement in the gangsta rap censorship movement in the 1990s and early 2000s.2 
Initially targeted by white conservatives, the genre began to be heavily criticized by black 
liberals in 1993, and later by the Nation of Islam. An important cornerstone of their criticisms 
 
1“The American Underclass,” Time (EBSCOhost), August 29, 1977, 18, accessed May 9, 2020, https://eds-b-
ebscohost-com.libproxy.lib.ilstu.edu/eds/de  tail?vid=9&sid=9660cfd1-1dcd-4b9c-b94d-9e813cb9bdfd%40pdc-
vsessmgr05&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdm Umc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=53520812&db=a9h. 
2While the spelling of the word “gangster” is incorrect, this is how rap artists, journalists, commentators, and   
others utilized the term when discussing the genre. In the interest of accuracy, I will be using this spelling for the 
duration of the study. 
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was underclass ideology-the belief that issues like crime, poverty, and welfare dependency were 
connected to group behavior and culture rather than political economy. Many of their critiques 
seem reasonable when looking at the genre and its subject matter. 
 Gangsta rap is a sub-genre of rap that originated in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s. While 
rappers like Ice-T and Schoolly D are credited with founding the genre, it became popular with 
the release of Niggaz Wit Attitudes (N.W.A.)’s 1988 debut Straight Outta Compton, an album  
that served as a critique of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)’s maltreatment of  
African Americans. The genre was controversial, as it often incorporated lyrics that referenced 
gang culture, drug usage, and misogynistic acts.3 
 By the late 1980s, gangsta rap would find itself in the crosshairs of a censorship 
movement. While organized censorship efforts against music date back to the 1950s, music 
censorship reached its height by the mid-1980s.4 Groups like the Parents Music Resource Center 
(PMRC), organized by “Washington Wives” Tipper Gore, Susan Baker, Pam Howar, and Sally 
Nevius, initially lead the fray against rock artists, pressuring record stores not to sell their music 
and organizing a Senate hearing on rock music, which culminated with record companies 
agreeing to place Parental Advisory labels on albums that were considered explicit. 
Conservatives also targeted rap music. While they voiced their criticism of Ice T’s and N.W.A.’s 
sexually-explicit albums, the brunt of their censorship efforts was directed toward porno rap 
group 2 Live Crew. Many called for an outright ban on their sexually-charged album As Nasty as 
 
3Bryan J. McCann, Mark of Criminality: Rhetoric, Race, and Gangsta Rap in the War-On-Crime Era (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2017), 34-53, 68. 
4Claude Chastagner, “The Parents' Music Resource Center: From Information to Censorship,” Popular Music 18, 
no.2 (1999): 183. 
3 
 
They Wanna Be. Conservative lawyer Jack Thompson even prosecuted the group on obscenity 
charges for having performed the album’s lyrics at a concert venue.5 
 Scholars have looked at rap censorship in the context of the culture wars. While the term 
“culture wars” was originally used to describe the conflict between German liberals and Catholic 
conservatives over the role of the Church in German society in the 1870s (Kulturkampfe), it has 
taken on new meaning in its American context.6 
 James Davidson Hunter pioneered the scholarly study of the American culture wars in his 
groundbreaking text Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. According to his argument, 
groups are in a constant struggle to impose their morals, beliefs, and principles on American 
society. While this conflict initially took place between religious groups (i.e. Catholics, 
Protestants, Mormons, Jews,) in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Hunter contends that the new 
culture wars in the last few decades of the 20th century were taking place between two vaguely 
defined “polarizing impulses”-orthodoxy and progressivism.7 He defines orthodoxy, for 
example, as the “commitment on the part of adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent 
authority” while progressivists “[tend] to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing 
assumptions of contemporary life.”8 He asserts that cultural conservatives and liberals, 
respectively, embrace these impulses while promoting their brand of American life in several 
“fields of conflict,” including the family, education, media and the arts, law, and politics.9  
 Many scholars have used Hunter’s concept of “polarizing impulses” to make sense of rap 
censorship. Andrew Hartman, for instance, argues that the 2 Live Crew episode in the censorship 
 
5Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2015), 
177-180. 
6Hartman, A War for the Soul of America, 297. 
7James Davidson Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 35-42. 
8Hunter, Culture Wars, 44-45. 
9Hunter, Culture Wars, 46, 50-51. 
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movement was an outgrowth of the conflict between New Left and neoconservative sensibilities 
that had fueled the American culture wars since the 1960s.10 
 Scholars have also attempted to fit black censors within this narrow culture wars 
framework. Describing her as a “[c]ultural war activist,” historian Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar explains 
how C. Delores Tucker, a black politician, and William Bennett, who had served in the Reagan 
and George H. W. Bush administrations, pressured Time Warner to sell its stake in Interscope 
Records in 1995, a company that was known for producing gangsta rap. Ogbar opines that they 
did so because they were concerned about how the genre contributed to the moral degradation of 
American youth.11 
 Aside from the culture wars, scholars have also used a generational/civil rights 
framework as a way of explaining black censors’ responses to gangsta rap. Scholars who 
embrace this framework argue that black censorship grew out of a generational conflict between 
the civil rights and hip-hop generations.12 For them, censorship was the result of the former, 
which tended to be made up of older, middle-class blacks, trying to impose their morals and 
values on rappers (the hip-hop generation), whose lyrics left them at odds with the previous 
generation. Middle-class blacks, they further argue, often cited the Civil Rights Movement 
(1954-1968) in their arguments against gangsta rap, which they felt embodied the morals and 
values of their generation. Highlighting how black censors like Tucker, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and 
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun often drew on civil rights rhetoric as justification for their 
 
10Hartman, A War for the Soul of America, 180-183. 
11Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, “Slouching Toward Bork: The Culture Wars and Self-Criticism in Hip-Hop Music,” Journal 
of Black Studies 30 (1999): 165-166. 
12The ‘hip hop generation” is a term popularized by journalist Bakari Kitwana in his book of the same name. Born 
between 1965 and 1984, Kitwana contends that this generation has been shaped by several historical developments, 
including globalization, deindustrialization, and mass incarceration. He further argues that this generation is 
constantly at odds with the civil rights/Black Power generation, since the latter has shown an “unwillingness…to 
adjust to the social transformations that have shaped the hip-hop generation.” (23). See Bakari Kitwana, The Hip-
Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African-American Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 11-23. 
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censorship efforts, for example, Bryan J. McCann sums up black censorship as a “generational 
battle over the mobilization of black affect toward middle-class sensibilities on the one hand and 
criminalized leisure and style on the other.”13 While rather critical of gangsta rap censorship, 
arguing that it obscured how deindustrialization and neoliberalism contributed to “social 
disintegration” in black urban areas,  George Lipsitz also looks at how censors drew on the 
lessons of the Movement to make their case against gangsta rap.14  
 While both the culture wars and generational conflict frameworks provide insight into the 
type of rationales that motivated individuals and groups to censor gangsta rap, scholars have 
applied them in such a way that promote a narrow understanding of the black backlash against 
the genre. Their tendency to either place censors within a rigid liberal-conservative dichotomy or 
to trace their criticisms to their collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement causes them to 
disregard other political and ideological concerns that informed their criticisms of the genre. 
While the former suggests that censors, regardless of race, pursued censorship for similar 
reasons, the latter assumes that black censorship efforts can be understood without considering 
contemporaneous political and ideological trends in American society. 
 Rather than simply being a facet of the broader culture wars or a site of generational 
conflict, then, black gangsta rap censorship was reflective of a conservative turn in American 
politics that was informed by underclass ideology. The underclass is a subject that has been of 
interest to social scientists, journalists, policymakers, and politicians since the late 20th century. 
The term was first used in social science research by Gunnar Myrdal, who used it to describe a 
segment of the American population that was poor and socially alienated from the rest of society. 
 
13McCann, Mark of Criminality, 84. 
14George Lipsitz, “The Hip Hop Hearings: Censorship, Social Memory, and Intergenerational Tensions Among  
African Americans,” in Generations of Youth: Youth Culture and History in Twentieth-Century America, eds. Joe  
Austin and Michael Nevin Willard (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 395, 402, 404. 
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While social scientists initially looked at the underclass largely in the context of political 
economy, the concept would later be used to define groups in terms of race, culture, and 
behavior.15 
 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Assistant Secretary of Labor in both the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, was one of the earliest social scientists to link the underclass to race, 
culture, and behavior. In his influential 1965 study The Negro Family: A Case for National 
Action, for instance, he argued that while African Americans had attained their full civil rights, 
they would continue to be burdened with issues like poverty and unemployment because of the 
debilitating effects that institutional racism had on the black family structure, which he argued 
was evident with the emasculation of black males and female-led families.16 Arguing that such 
conditions were evidence of black pathology, Moynihan stressed to President Johnson that any 
efforts to redress black economic inequality had to target blacks’ supposed dysfunctional 
behavior and culture. Drawing from Moynihan’s recommendations, Johnson initiated the Great 
Society, which funded programs that were largely geared toward combating poverty by way of 
correcting poor minorities’ supposed character flaws. Moynihan’s analysis was important 
because it set the terms for how future social scientists and government officials would analyze, 
and set policy recommendations for, the black underclass.17 
 
15Alice O’ Conner, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S.  
 History (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001), 266-267. 
16From Moynihan going forward, social scientists, politicians, policymakers, and journalists tended to attribute 
negative stereotypes associated with the black underclass, like single-parent, female-headed families, to black 
women. In the 1980s, however, writers began to critique such assessments about black women. See, for instance, 
Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), 325-335. 
17Toure F. Reed, “Why Moynihan Was Not So Misunderstood at the Time: The Mythological Prescience of the  
 Moynihan Report and the Problem of Institutional Structuralism,” nonsite.org, September 4, 2015, accessed May 9, 
2020, http://nonsite.org/article/why-moynihan-was-not-so-misunderstood-at-the-time.  
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 By the 1980s, the black underclass had become a growing subject of interest among 
social scientists, journalists, politicians, and policymakers. During this period, poverty had 
increased in black urban areas despite the Great Society’s antipoverty programs. This was 
accompanied by a rise in crime, out-of-wedlock births, unemployment, and several other 
conditions. Rather than identifying deindustrialization as a root cause of these conditions, 
conservative scholars, such as Charles Murray, and politicians, such as President Ronald Reagan, 
argued that the Great Society’s welfare programs had exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, 
poverty by promoting dependency and immorality among the poor.18  By the early 1990s, liberal 
Democrats had also come to embrace underclass ideology, resulting in a bipartisan commitment 
to discouraging underclass pathologies via tough-on-crime legislation and welfare reform. With 
its emphasis on disciplining poor people who were disproportionally African American and 
Latino, underclass ideology was an important facet of the burgeoning neoliberal consensus. This 
new approach found its greatest expression in two acts that were endorsed by former president 
Bill Clinton: the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. While the former sought to curtail criminality 
by imposing a mandatory life sentence on repeat offenders, the latter sought to discourage 
dependency by limiting the number of years a person could receive welfare benefits.19 Many 
liberals and conservatives argued that the latter would also reduce illegitimacy and promote the 
formation of nuclear families, since it was believed that it would disincentivize women from 
having babies out-of-wedlock.20 
 
18Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2016), 308. 
19Daryl A. Carter, Brother Bill: President Clinton and the Politics of Race and Class (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 2016), 49-50, 114-115, 170. 
20Carter, Brother Bill, 182. In addition to its welfare policies, the Clinton administration also passed the 1993 Family 




Given this, there are many advantages to looking at black gangsta rap censorship in the 
context of underclass ideology and the rightward shift in American politics. First, it shows that 
gangsta rap censorship was much more than a culture wars or generational issue; black censors 
set out to suppress what they believed to be a major contributor to black social pathologies. 
Second, this approach helps to deepen our understanding of the broad appeal of behavioral rather 
than political-economic understandings of racial and economic inequality. It also helps to show 
that African-American political agency cannot be neatly categorized as liberal or conservative.   
 Chapter 1 looks at the origins and development of underclass ideology and how it 
manifested in federal policy from 1961 until 1996. First, the chapter provides a brief overview of 
American politics, showing how a rightward shift in post-WWII American politics informed how 
politicians and policymakers sought to redress black social issues. After examining the culture of 
poverty framework’s influence over the anti-delinquency and antipoverty measures of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, respectively, the chapter then considers how underclass 
ideology affected Nixon’s “law and order” policies. Against the backdrop of neoliberalism, the 
chapter then details how underclass ideology enjoyed bipartisan support from conservative 
Republicans and liberal Democrats. It then gives an in-depth overview of the anti-crime and 
welfare reform bills and how blacks responded to them. Blacks’ general support of crime 
prevention and welfare reform highlighted their commitment to underclass ideology and 
neoliberalism, which served as the intellectual foundation for them to rest their claims about the 
benefits of censorship. 
 Chapter 2 then looks at black liberals’ criticisms of gangsta rap. It considers four issues 
that they felt the genre exacerbated among its African-American audience: crime, violence, 
 
family and medical related reasons. See Deborah  L. Drexler, “Basic Requirements of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act,” The Compleat Lawyer 10, no.4 (Fall 1993): 6-8. 
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sexual promiscuity, and family disorganization. First, the chapter analyses several black liberals’ 
thoughts on the genre and their proposed efforts to subdue its supposed influence on black 
criminality and violence. With sexual promiscuity, the chapter explores the ways in which critics 
sought to counter the negative influence they believed the genre had on black female sexual 
behavior. Finally, with family disorganization, the chapter looks at how censors linked gangsta 
rap to facets of dysfunctional black family life, such as irresponsible fathers and unruly children.  
 Chapter 3 explores the NOI’s censorship efforts in relation to these same issues. 
Following an examination of NOI scholarship and the Million Man March, the chapter considers  
how Conrad Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan used the March’s themes of atonement, 
reconciliation, and responsibility to combat violence and criminality among rappers and their 
black listening audience. It also looks at events inspired by the March, such as the Million 
Woman March and the Million Family March, and delves into how they were used to challenge  
gangsta rap’s supposed advocacy of  black female sexual promiscuity and family 
disorganization, respectively. Both the NOI’s and black liberals’ censorship efforts showed their 
preference for behavioral solutions to black social problems, so this chapter, more so than the 
previous ones, examines how black rap censorship can help us understand the rightward shift in 
black politics in the 1990s. Believing that rap could also be used to cure blacks of these issues, 
the chapter concludes by looking at rappers who embraced the NOI’s belief, and how their music 
was in accordance with the organization’s censorship aims. 
The conclusion analyzes rap criticism after 2000, after major censorship initiatives had 
declined. It looks at the criticisms of prominent black liberals like Bill Cosby and Barack 
Obama, and those of Louis Farrakhan. It then looks at how issues tied to the black underclass, 
like crime and family disorganization, persisted during this period despite continued criticisms of 
10 
 
the genre and calls for censorship. Finally, it considers how behavioral approaches have always 
been insufficient in dealing with issues that have plagued African Americans in the post-WWII 























CHAPTER I: UNDERCLASS IDEOLOGY AND FEDERAL POLICY, 1961-1996 
 On August 25, 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act. An anti-crime law, it contained some of the most punitive provisions that would come to 
have a disproportionate effect on poor people of color in subsequent years: mandatory life 
sentences for repeat offenders, drastic cuts to educational programs for inmates, and increased 
police presence in black urban areas.21 
 On August 22, 1996, Congress also passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act. A welfare reform law, it contained provisions that would also have a negative 
impact on poor minorities. One such provision repealed Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), which forced 
millions of African Americans into low-paying jobs that offered no escape from poverty nor 
welfare dependency.22 
 For then-president Bill Clinton, these laws were the realization of a long-fought effort to 
curtail crime and reform the welfare system. Running his 1992 presidential campaign on 
promises to get “‘tough on crime”’23 and “end welfare as we know it,”24 Clinton, along with his 
African-American constituency, New Democrats, and Republicans, supported punitive measures 
to lessen crime and dependency. 
 These laws were the culmination of decades-long efforts made by social scientists, 
politicians, and policymakers to redress black social issues by “fixing” black behavior. Faced 
with mounting poverty, delinquency, and crime in black urban areas, politicians like John F. 
 
21Carter, Brother Bill, 114-115. 
22Carter, Brother Bill, 193, 197-198. 
23Gwen Ifill, “THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: The Democrats; Clinton, in Houston Speech, Assails Bush on Crime Issue,” 
New York Times (Nexis Uni), July 24, 1992, accessed May 19, 2020, https://advance-lexis.com.libproxy.lib.ilstu.edu 
/api/document?collection=news&id= urn:contentItem:3SC4-7YM0-000P-24WB-00000-00&context=1516831. 
24Carter, Brother Bill, 181. 
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Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson sought to address these issues by developing federal policies 
that focused on character building and fostering strong families.  By the 1980s, conservative 
social scientists and politicians had come to embrace the view that punitive, rather than soft 
prevention policies, could suppress crime, poverty, and dependency, which came to be 
increasingly associated with inner-city blacks. Liberal Democrats also began to accept this article 
of faith by the early 1990s, resulting in bipartisan support for the laws mentioned above. 
 This chapter traces the origins and development of underclass ideology from the 1960s to 
the 1990s. After a brief synopsis on American politics from the 1930s to the 1960s, it examines 
how social scientists like Moynihan informed federal policies and programs geared toward 
African Americans in the 1960s and 70s. Against the backdrop of deindustrialization, 
globalization, and neoliberalism, it then considers how underclass ideology encouraged Raegan 
to pursue punitive policies against poor, inner-city people of color in the 1980s. Finally, it 
discusses the bipartisan support of underclass ideology with the New Democrats, and how this 
affected Clinton’s policies toward minorities.  
 This chapter also considers how African Americans responded to the crime prevention 
and welfare reform bills. Blacks generally supported the bills, albeit for different reasons: some 
supported their more punitive measures while others felt that their soft preventative provisions 
were more useful. Their attitudes reveal that they were as invested in the idea that behavior was a 
major cause of black social issues as liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans were. This 
is important because it helps to understand the rationale behind black censors’ censorship efforts.  
 The New Deal, which were a set of domestic policies and programs created by the 
Roosevelt administration (1933-1945) aimed at alleviating the economic devastation caused by 
the Great Depression, ushered in what historian Toure F. Reed has called the “public interest 
13 
 
model of government.”25 This form of governance, which dominated American politics roughly 
from the 1930s to the 1960s, promoted the idea that it was the federal government’s 
responsibility to promote the public good by ensuring that Americans were ensured their civil 
rights and had equal access to adequate housing, education , jobs, healthcare, and a social safety 
net.26 Given the latter, liberals, leftists, and progressives prior to 1945 often advanced policies 
that linked racial and working-class concerns. Organizations like the National Urban League 
(NUL), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the 
National Negro Congress (NNC), for instance, often saw interracial working-class solidarity as 
an important prerequisite to racial equality, and therefore supported black labor disputes and 
black involvement in unions toward this end.27 
 This consideration of the interplay between racial and working-class issues became less 
of a staple in American politics after World War II. During the early Cold War, the Republican 
and Southern Dixiecrat-led Congress began to undo the labor gains of the New Deal by passing 
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and utilizing the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 
both of which curtailed the strength of the union movement.28 Due to this attack on working-
class interests, liberal policymakers began to address racial issues in a way that was divorced 
from political economy. Reed, for instance, notes that while the civil rights legislation of the 
1960s was in line with the public good model of governance inaugurated by the New Deal, it was 
“incapable of redressing the structural economic sources of racial disparities.”29 Such a lack of 
commitment to political-economic solutions to racial inequality would shape the way politicians, 
 
25Toure F. Reed, Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism (New York: Verso Books, 2020), 15. 
26Reed, Toward Freedom, 2-5. 
27Reed, Toward Freedom,  28-40. 
28Reed, Toward Freedom, 54-55. 
29Reed, Toward Freedom, 5. 
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social scientists, and policymakers framed and responded to black social issues during this 
period. 
 Because they failed to consider the political-economic underpinnings of black inequality,  
many blacks’ economic status in the postwar era remained dire. While America’s middle class 
grew in the years after World War II, many blacks experienced a decline in their economic status 
due to postwar recessions and a loss of jobs through automation. By the 1960s, the black 
unemployment rate was more than double that of whites.30 Federal housing policy also 
contributed to blacks’ bleak economic status. Up until it was outlawed by the 1968 Civil Rights 
Act, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which was a federal agency created by the 1934 
National Housing Act to promote home ownership, encouraged real estate investors to practice 
redlining, which denied mortgage loans to inner-city blacks on the basis that they constituted a 
high financial risk and would reduce property values in white-occupied residential areas. This 
made it difficult for them to relocate to the suburbs where good jobs were located.31 These 
conditions caused many poor urban blacks to be concentrated in cities where they had limited job 
prospects.32  
 President Kennedy grew concerned that such a high concentration of poor African 
Americans in urban areas would lead to an increase in delinquency and violence. Therefore, he 
directed his efforts toward establishing programs that centered on education, job training, and 
youth empowerment. One such program was New York’s Mobilization for Youth, which was 
 
30Hinton, From the War on Poverty, 28. 
31Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black 
Homeownership (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 31-37. 
32Hinton, From the War on Poverty, 29. 
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established in 1961 and offered job training and social services to the city’s black and Latino 
residents.33 
 A problem with the Kennedy administration’s programs is that they assumed that the 
social issues blacks faced were an outgrowth of their supposed pathological behavior rather than 
structural forces. Historian Elizabeth Hinton explains how the federal government’s tendency to 
create programs to redress poor blacks’ supposed behavioral deficiencies during this period 
“removed fundamental socioeconomic change from the domestic policy agenda” and “aimed to 
change the psychological impact of racism within individuals rather than the impact of the long 
history of racism within American institutions.”34 Using such an approach to deal with these 
issues ensured that they would worsen over time. 
 While the Kennedy administration initiated federal programs geared at targeting black 
delinquency, the Johnson administration’s programs focused on black poverty. The main 
architect of Johnson’s antipoverty programs was Daniel Patrick Moynihan.35  
 As previously mentioned, Moynihan was one of the earliest social scientists to link 
African Americans to the underclass in his influential 1965 study The Negro Family. Building 
largely on E. Franklin Frazier’s research on black families, Moynihan argued that black poverty 
could be attributed to a “tangle of pathology,” which he described as a set of cultural 
characteristics specific to African Americans that encouraged conditions like unemployment, 
dependency, and single-parent, matrifocal households. His analysis of black poverty was 
informed by his embrace of what Reed has called “institutional structuralism,” which was a 
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framework that attributed poverty to group culture rather than political economy, and therefore 
identified acculturation as the crucial remedy to economic inequality.36 
Consequently, many of the Great Society’s programs reflected Moynihan’s analysis of 
black poverty. Johnson’s Community Action Programs are a case-in-point.  Created by the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, these programs “brought the methods employed by 
Mobilization of Youth and other juvenile delinquency demonstration projects of the Kennedy 
years to the national level,” as one historian put it.37 Keeping true to Moynihan’s analysis, they 
targeted black poverty not by addressing blacks’ lack of access to resources that would allow for 
economic stability, such as access to jobs that paid a living wage and childcare resources, but by 
attempting to alter blacks’ behavior. The Job Corps, for instance, offered job training to poor 
people between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one while the Work Experience Program aided 
“‘unemployed fathers and other needy persons’” in gaining the ‘“capability for self-support or 
personal independence.’”38 
 While the Great Society reflected the federal government’s growing optimism in 
preventative programs and their ability to eradicate black poverty, many had come to believe that 
black social pathology had reached a point of no return. This can be seen by looking at the media 
coverage on the 1965 Watts Riot. Though the riot started as a civil dispute between the LAPD 
and a black family, many periodicals saw it as evidence of a growing black pathology and the 
Great Society’s inability to suppress it.39 Building off Moynihan’s analysis, the Wall Street 
Journal cited the “‘spreading disintegration of the Negro family”’ as a major cause of the riot. 
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The riot also left the New York Times to conclude that the “‘worst areas of Negro urban poverty 
have seemed oblivious’” to Johnson’s antipoverty programs.40 
 Regardless of how the press viewed the riot, federal policymakers continued to stress the 
importance of discouraging black social pathology via preventative programs. While Hinton 
observes that they “acknowledged the socioeconomic conditions that precipitated the riot,” they 
tended to focus on demographic indicators like single-parent households and illegitimacy as 
possible causes. Consequently, they proposed the development of programs that would provide 
African Americans with “‘opportunities’ for conforming [their] behavior.’” One federally-funded 
mentorship program in South Carolina, for instance, sought to curtail violence among African-
American youth by providing them with male role models.41 
 While the Johnson administration invested in preventative programs, it also supported 
punitive measures for curtailing black crime and violence, which were advanced by the Nixon 
administration.42 In 1970, for instance, Nixon pushed for the passage of the District of Columbia 
Court Reorganization Act of 1970, which called for longer sentences for violent, repeat 
offenders.43 He also initiated the “long range master plan,” which expanded the American prison 
system for a period of 10 years.44  
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 Broad changes in America’s economy in the 1970s ensured that Nixon’s efforts to redress 
black crime and violence would not have much effect. With deindustrialization, for instance, a 
burgeoning information service economy started to displace the industrial economy. 
Globalization also assisted in the decline of America’s industrial economy, as many 
multinational corporations began to outsource their manufacturing jobs to Third World countries 
to bypass labor unions and federal minimum wage laws. These developments had a 
disproportionate effect on working-class African Americans, who were overrepresented in the 
industrial sector and who lacked the education and training necessary to obtain new jobs offered 
by the service economy.  As a result, many of them were restricted to urban areas riddled with 
poverty and unemployment.45 
 As deindustrialization and globalization ravaged black urban areas, social scientists in the 
1980s sought to understand why poverty persisted in these areas. Rather than looking at the 
structural transformation of the U.S. economy’s disproportionate impact on African Americans, 
many looked at Johnson’s Great Society. This rationale served as the basis for Charles Murray’s 
1984 book Losing Ground. Murray argued that Johnson’s policies had failed to eliminate poverty 
in urban areas because it encouraged individuals to stay on welfare rather than creating 
incentives for them to look for jobs. He further explained that this encouraged black pathology, 
since it made “[u]nemployment, illegitimacy, crime, and welfare dependency…more rational 
[and] bred the kind of bad behavior that fed on itself and became pathological.”46 
 Social scientists were not the only ones who shaped underclass ideology during this 
period. Journalists also played an important role in this regard. While social scientists looked at 
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poverty in their research on the underclass, Alice O’ Connor notes that it “was neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition” for journalists describing the underclass; “deviant behavior 
was.”47 Ken Auletta, a journalist for The New Yorker, did more than any other journalist to 
popularize this view of the underclass. In his 1982 book The Underclass, for instance, Auletta 
measured the underclass strictly in terms of behavioral and moral deprivation. He classified them 
as welfare recipients, violent criminals, drug abusers, and high school dropouts.48 
 Murray’s and Auletta’s writings on the underclass signaled the rise of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism is a political, economic, and social ideology that began to gain traction in 
American society in the 1980s. Rather than stress the federal government’s role in creating 
programs to alleviate poverty, crime, illegitimacy, and other issues, neoliberalism instead called 
for the government to enforce “majoritarian values” via punitive measures as a solution to these 
issues. For example, limiting single mothers’ access to financial support and passing harsh 
sentencing laws to discourage illegitimacy and crime, respectively, were both facets of 
neoliberalism that enjoyed broad bipartisan support in the 1990s.49 It is hardly surprising, then, 
that individuals like Murray and Auletta were seen in tandem with the burgeoning neoliberal 
consensus in the 1980s, since both they and neoliberalism tended to link society’s problems to 
individuals’ moral shortcomings rather than broader structural issues. 
 Underclass ideology complimented Reagan’s neoliberal approach to governance. Like 
other conservatives of his era, Reagan embraced the idea that many of society’s problems 
stemmed from the federal government’s tendency to encourage social pathologies among poor 
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minorities via welfare programs. Therefore, he sought out more strident measures as solutions to 
these issues, like the War on Drugs. While Reagan declared a “war on drugs” during a 1982 
press conference, his efforts to double down on drug use intensified during the mid-1980s, when 
crack-cocaine exploded on the American scene. Rather than invest in drug prevention programs, 
Reagan instead called for draconian legislation that would target sellers and users of crack, a 
drug that tended to be associated with blacks and Latinos. One example is the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, which included harsh mandatory sentencing for those who sold crack.50  
 Neoliberalism and underclass ideology also affected Reagan’s views on black families, 
which were clearly expressed in his radio address on welfare reform in 1986. Speaking on 
“welfare poor” families living in the inner cities, Reagan argued that social welfare programs 
exacerbated poverty by “[rupturing] the bonds holding poor families together.” He explained that 
these types of families were broken because such programs encouraged mothers to stay single 
and unwed in exchange for benefits. He also said that these programs usurped the role of the 
father, denying them the right to be breadwinners.51 
 Perhaps nothing captures Reagan’s views on the “welfare poor” better than his use of the 
“welfare queen” trope. While the term was first used by journalists in the 1970s, it began to be 
widely used in political debates about welfare in the 1980s. The “welfare queen” described 
single mothers who refused to work and relied on the state for financial security. Such a figure 
represented dependency and illegitimacy, since the more children she had out-of-wedlock 
guaranteed additional support from the state. In speeches, Reagan often referred to a ‘“Chicago 
welfare queen” who had “80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards,” and whose “tax-
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free income alone is over $150,000.”’52 Though he never mentioned race, many commentators 
took the welfare queen to be black, since welfare dependency tended to be associated with 
single, African-American mothers at this time.53 Stating it plainly, Michelle Alexander asserts 
that ‘“welfare queen’ became a not-so-subtle code for ‘lazy, greedy, black ghetto mother.’”54 
 Conservative Republicans like Reagan were not the only group of politicians who 
embraced neoliberalism. By the mid-1980s, liberal Democrats had also started to align 
themselves with the neoliberal consensus, which was indicative of the new direction their politics  
were taking by this period. Since the New Deal, liberal Democrats tended to support policies that 
favored “special interests” groups like women, the LGBTQ community, the working class, the 
poor, and minorities. Yet in the face of a political culture that was increasingly shifting 
rightward, many Democrats came to believe that minimal government and traditional values like 
personal responsibility and hard work were the solutions to many of these groups’ problems, 
especially the latter two.55 
 It is within this political context that the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) was 
formed. Founded in 1985 in the wake of the Democratic loss in the 1984 presidential election, 
the DLC was comprised of Democrats that would become key players on the national political 
stage in the 1990s, such as Al Gore and Bill Clinton. Believing that their commitment to “special 
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interests” had alienated the Party from its white, Protestant, middle-class constituency, many in 
the DLC began to shift the Party rightward in terms of how it dealt with minorities. Personal 
responsibility, hard work, law and order, and family values became common prescriptions for 
issues that seemed to plague poor people of color. While the DLC helped to shift Democrats 
(now called “New Democrats”) to the right, Clinton, who chaired the DLC from 1990-1991, 
would do more than any other politician to push its agenda to the center of the Democratic Party 
platform during his presidency.56 
 During his 1992 campaign and presidency, Bill Clinton often showed how underclass 
scholars had a profound influence on his thinking about poor minorities. Perhaps one scholar 
who influenced his thinking more than any other was William J. Wilson. A social democrat and 
sociologist, Wilson ushered in new ways of understanding the black urban underclass. In his 
magnum opus The Truly Disadvantaged, he departed from underclass orthodoxy by highlighting 
the role that economic forces played in its development. He argued, for instance, that joblessness 
among poor urban blacks was largely a result of deindustrialization rather than a “culture of 
poverty.”57 Despite this, Wilson still conformed to many underclass notions in his text. For one, 
he argued that the outmigration of working- and middle-class blacks from the inner city to the 
suburbs starting in the 1970s deprived poor blacks of ‘“social buffers”’ (i.e. institutions and 
working- and middle-class families) that had traditionally served to counter long-term 
joblessness, crime, and welfare dependency by providing a check on behaviors that he believed 
encouraged such conditions, suggesting that the cure for such social ills was partially rooted in 
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behavior. 58 Echoing Moynihan, Wilson also identified single-parent, female-headed households 
as a major impetus of poverty and welfare dependency among poor blacks in urban areas.59 
Overall, Wilson’s text is important not only because it signaled bipartisan support for underclass 
ideology, but also because it anticipated the direction that Clinton and many others would take 
on issues like crime and dependency during his tenure as president. 
Clinton expressed a commitment to being tough on crime even before his presidency. 
This was partially motivated by Michael Dukakis’s disastrous run for president in 1988. During 
the race, Willie Horton, a black convicted felon, assaulted a man and raped his wife while on a 
furlough. Dukakis’s opponent, George. H.W. Bush, used the incident to portray Dukakis, who 
was a known supporter of the furlough program, as being soft on crime, which helped Bush win 
the presidency. Realizing that moderation on the crime issue was politically disastrous, Clinton 
flew out to his home state of Arkansas in 1992 to oversee the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a 
mentally-challenged black man. Hoping to distance himself from soft-on-crime Democrats like 
Dukakis, Clinton remarked after the execution that “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m 
soft on crime.”60 
In an effort to reduce crime, Clinton urged Congress to pass an anti-crime bill during his 
State of the Union Address on January 25, 1994. Drawing on neoliberal themes like minimal 
government, he explained why passing the bill was urgent: “Our problems go way beyond the 
reach of Government. They’re rooted in the loss of values, in the disappearance of work, and the  
breakdown of our families and communities.”61 
 
58Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, 56. 
59Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, 26-29, 71-72. 
60Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 54. Quoted on 56. 
61Quoted in Carter, Brother Bill, 117. 
24 
 
 One of the bill’s provisions called for an increased police presence in black urban areas. 
It provided funding to hire former servicemen and women as police officers. This measure 
seemed to have a positive effect on crime reduction. According to the Department of Justice, 
violent crime in these areas decreased during the Clinton years. Historian Daryl Carter, however, 
argues that this provision contributed to an increased rate of black male incarceration, since it 
provided officers with an opportunity to arrest black men without just cause.62 
 Another provision kept inmates from receiving Pell Grants. While the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 provided financial assistance to college students, it did little to provide that same 
assistance to inmates. The Pell Grant Program alleviated this oversight by funding inmates’ 
education while they were incarcerated. With it being repealed, however, many black inmates 
were unable to receive an education, which limited their prospects for employment upon being 
released.  This encouraged many to turn to the illicit economy and therefore increased their 
chances of becoming repeat offenders.63 
 Black males’ recidivism added fuel to the bill’s three-strike provision, which was perhaps 
its most highly publicized. The provision carried a minimum life sentence for anyone convicted 
of violent or drug-related crimes three or more times. Because black men were overrepresented 
among individuals who committed these crimes, it ensured that they would be disproportionally 
affected by it.64 
 Aside from its more punitive provisions, the crime bill also included preventative 
programs that were aimed at curtailing violent, criminal behavior. The Midnight Basketball 
League, for instance, funded basketball courts for at-risk urban youth of color. It was believed 
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that such a measure would encourage youth to invest their time and energies in recreational 
activities rather than committing violent acts or joining gangs. This measure, however, was met 
with opposition from conservatives in Congress, many of whom believed that such programs 
failed to curtail crime. As a result, the funding for the program was reduced in the final bill.65 
While the program reveals how committed politicians were to finding behavioral solutions to 
issues like crime, the reduction of its funding is indicative of how repudiated preventative 
programs had become by this period. 
 Strong black support was important to the bill’s passage. Many were split on the 
provisions in the bill: some supported its punitive measures while others endorsed its 
preventative programs. Daryl Carter argues that many African Americans were receptive to 
neoliberalism, and therefore welcomed harsh measures they felt could curb violent behavior 
among poor urban blacks.66 He also explains that those who supported the latter measure saw the 
bill as a compromise: while they did not support its punitive measures, they supported it 
regardless because it offered some funding for preventative programs.67 
 Many African-American politicians saw the bill’s draconian measures as an ideal 
solution to black crime. They argued that tough-love policies were needed to effectively suppress 
crime in black urban areas, which was an issue they believed was beyond the scope of 
preventative programs. Ten black mayors pledged their support for the bill. One of the mayors, 
Kurt Schmoke, argued that the bill could ‘“send a signal to black perpetrators that if there is evil 
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manifested by actions taken by individuals who choose to prey upon our residents that that evil 
will be responded to quickly and correctly.”’68 
 Their support of the crime bill was indicative of a consensus that African Americans had 
about their poor urban brethren. Many of them had come to believe that violence in poor black 
urban areas had grown to epidemic proportions, and therefore welcomed federal assistance in 
subduing it. In keeping with underclass notions about black violence, many argued that violence 
in these areas was an outgrowth of innate pathologies rather than economic forces. An article 
written by Gwen Ifill, an African-American journalist, is telling on this point: “Representative 
Charles B. Rangel, the New York Democrat who has been pressing the Administration to spend 
more time addressing narcotics and crime, said the speech touched a chord in the black 
community. We have not spoken out about the cancers we have in our own bodies…But the 
violence has reached a point where we need help.”69  
 Aware of blacks’ embrace of underclass ideology, Clinton sought to gain support for his 
crime bill by reaching out to his African-American constituency. Shortly after his initial crime 
bill was rejected by Congress, he traveled to a black church in Maryland to ensure its 
congregants of the bill’s benefits to black communities. He attempted to garner support by 
playing on their fears of a growing black underclass and its threat to their communities: “These 
are children in the church who have been gunned down: I know it. The least we can do is help 
you to be protected. The least we can do is put people on the streets who cannot only catch 
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criminals but prevent crime as good law enforcement officers. The least we can do if people are 
totally hopeless is to get them out of your hair so they won’t be bothering you.”70 
 Clinton’s pandering to black churches proved effective. Many African-American 
clergymen came out in support of the bill. Pastors from various churches wrote a statement in 
support of the bill, stating that “while we do not agree with every provision in the crime bill, we 
do believe and emphatically support the bill’s goal to save our communities, and, most 
importantly, our children.”71 
 Blacks did not unilaterally support the bill’s strident measures. Many black politicians in 
Congress felt that the initial bill did not provide enough financial support for preventative 
measures. Perhaps no one group expressed greater frustration than the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC). The CBC is a political organization made up of black members of Congress. 
Founded in 1971, its goal is to support legislation that is favorable to African Americans. While 
the Caucus originally voted against the bill because Congress dropped the Racial Justice Act 
from it, it ended up voting for it because it contained an extension of the preventative measures 
members favored.72  This shows that while black attitudes about the bill were nuanced, African 
Americans, like many others, believed that issues like crime could be solved by shaping behavior 
rather than addressing broader structural issues.  
 Despite some initial rough patches, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
passed in late August 1994. At the official signing of the bill in September of that year, Clinton 
outlined how its provisions would be implemented while invoking neoliberal themes like 
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personal responsibility, family values, and the importance of community.73 While he does not 
specifically mention race, the fact that he expressed his position on crime by overseeing the 
execution of a black male, embraced the same law-and-order rhetoric that Republicans used to 
criminalize black males, and sought to exploit black fears of a violent black underclass suggest 
that the bill was meant to target poor people of color who lived in urban areas. Yet he was not 
alone: blacks who were advocates of either soft or harsh prevention measures also saw the bill as 
a way of reducing violence and crime in black urban areas. Underlying their support was a belief 
that these individuals constituted a violent growing underclass whose behavior needed to be 
corrected. 
 Much like his stance on crime, Clinton’s attitudes about welfare reform were the product 
of underclass ideology. Much of his thinking on the matter seemed to come from liberal social 
scientists like David Ellwood, who had begun to shape policy debates about the issue in the 
1980s. Ellwood, an economist and professor at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy’s School of 
Government who later served as Clinton’s Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 
proposed several solutions to what he saw as a dependency crisis among black, long-term 
welfare recipients. In his 1988 book Poor Support, for instance, Ellwood suggested that the 
federal government should cut off welfare benefits to recipients after two years while easing their 
transition into the workforce with job training programs. He also called for stricter child support 
laws for absent fathers.74 Time limits on welfare (which became known as the popular slogan 
“two years and you’re off”), fostering job preparedness, and enforcing familial norms were 
defining aspects of bipartisan welfare reform measures during the Clinton years. 
 
73Wolf Blitzer, “Text of Crime Bill Signing Ceremony,” CNN (Nexis Uni), September 13, 1994, accessed May 19, 
2020, https://advance-lexis-com. libproxy.lib.ilstu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD8-
YWW0-0029-54VS-00000-00&context=1516831. 
74Conner, Poverty Knowledge, 253, 255, 285. 
29 
 
 Even before he became president, Clinton was shown to be an advocate of welfare 
reform. During his tenure as governor of Arkansas, for instance, he called for a “new contract” 
between welfare recipients and the federal government, where ‘“[r]ecipients would commit to 
strive for independence in return for the benefits, and the government would commit to help 
them.”’ He also established a workfare program in the state that helped prepare recipients to 
transition from welfare to work by providing them with job training skills. Lastly, he supported a 
1988 welfare reform law that required teen mothers to stay in school and live at home with their 
parents to receive benefits.75 
 Clinton initially tried to curtail welfare among the “working poor” by expanding the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Created in 1976, the EITC is a tax credit that is awarded 
annually to moderate-to-low income taxpayers with children. Its purpose was to create incentives 
for low-paid, working-class people to work and sustain their families. The measure received 
support from both New Democrats and conservative Republicans, since it encouraged the 
working poor to stay off welfare and maintain their families. It was also appealing because it 
ensured that financial rewards went to working people with strong family values (the “deserving 
poor”) rather than poor, lazy blacks who had weak family structures (the “undeserving poor”).76 
 While Clinton pushed for welfare reform as early as 1992, he did not make any 
legislative strides toward “ending welfare as we know it” until 1995. His administration was 
dealing with several other issues in the interim. As alluded to earlier, Clinton spent much of his 
first term pursuing punitive crime prevention measures. The economy was also a major concern 
for Clinton. Tax cuts and a massive defense budget had contributed to a major recession, and 
Clinton spent his first few years in office trying to resolve it. Finally, health care reform weighed 
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heavily on Clinton’s mind during these years. By 1993, at least 15% of America’s population 
was without health coverage.77 
 He began to actively pursue welfare reform, however, when Republicans gained control 
of Congress in 1995. As Republicans became the majority in Congress for the first time in 40 
years, Clinton felt that it was necessary to balance his agenda with that of Congress’s, the latter 
of which included cutting welfare. Congressional Republicans had begun to double down on 
welfare reform as early as 1991, when 40 from the House formed the Wednesday Group, a 
caucus that called for mandatory work and time limits on welfare. Republicans also published 
the “Republican Contract with America” in 1994, which also called for welfare reform along the 
same lines.78  
 To push their welfare reform agenda, Congressional Republicans drafted two welfare 
reform bills in 1995 and 1996. Each bill contained a provision that repealed Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF). AFDC was a federal program that was created by the Social Security Act of 1935. Its 
goal was to provide financial assistance to low-income families. Many Republicans and New 
Democrats called for its repeal because they believed it incentivized poor people to stay out of 
work.79 Thus, both parties supported TANF, which placed a 5-year limit on financial assistance 
that individuals and their families could receive from the federal government. State governments, 
however, could choose to increase or decrease this limit. It also required recipients to find work 
two years after first receiving benefits.80  It was believed that such legislation would drive people 
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to get off welfare and find work, but this assumption belied the fact that many people were on 
welfare not because they were dependent on the government, but because there were a lack of 
accessible jobs that paid a living wage. 
Eliminating dependency was not the only goal of welfare reform. Politicians also hoped 
that it would reinforce cultural values that were popular during this period, such as the 
development of the two-parent household. Republicans and New Democrats believed that 
welfare was a major contributor to single motherhood because it encouraged mothers to stay 
single and unmarried in order to receive benefits from the state. Therefore, they hoped that 
reform would ‘“discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor 
mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children.”’81 
 Like Republicans and other New Democrats, Clinton supported the repeal of AFDC 
because he believed that it exacerbated dependency and family dissolution among poor people. 
He often cited underclass scholars in his defense of welfare reform. In a 1993 NBC interview, for 
instance, Clinton praised Murray for his analysis of the welfare system and its effects on poor 
people:  
He did the country a great service. I mean, he and I have often disagreed, but I think his 
analysis is essentially right…82 There is no question that… if we reduced Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children, it would be some incentive for people not to have dependent 
children out of wedlock … [O]nce a really poor woman has a child out of wedlock, it 
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 Despite the bipartisan drive for welfare reform, the Clinton administration rejected the 
first two welfare reform bills proposed by the Senate in 1995 and 1996. Clinton reasoned that the 
two bills would exacerbate dependency, keep recipients from gaining job-related skills, and lead 
to drastic cuts in programs that working people depended on: “the House bill would actually 
make it harder for many people to get off and stay off welfare…It removes any real 
responsibility for states to help people gain the training and skills they need to get and keep jobs. 
It even cuts child care for working people struggling to hold down jobs and stay off welfare.”84 
 Like Clinton, African-American politicians in Congress generally did not support 
Republican welfare reform measures. Of the 39 black members of Congress who voted on the 
proposed welfare reform bill of 1995, for example, only two voted in favor of it. Those who 
opposed it believed that the bill not only foreshadowed the end of the government’s commitment 
to poor people in general but to African Americans in particular.85 
 This does not mean that blacks were monolithic in their views on welfare reform. Many 
supported it. A survey cited in a 1994 Los Angeles Times article showed that 70% of blacks 
polled supported the more punitive aspects of welfare reform, including cutting off recipients 
after two years and requiring them to work. Political scientist Sharon D. Wright also explains 
that polls during the time show that black support for welfare reform was close to whites.86 
 Despite his initial rejections, Clinton eventually signed the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. Alice O’ Connor cites the possible reasons why Clinton signed 
off on the punitive welfare reform act. For one, she explains that once Republicans gained 
control of Congress in 1995, Clinton was unable to pursue less punitive welfare reform 
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measures, and as a result signed the bill as a political compromise. She also argued that his 
eventual embrace of the bill grew out of his earlier commitment to welfare reform and his desire 
to “out-tough…Republicans” on the issue.87 
 Clinton declared his intent to “end welfare as we know it” during his 1992 presidential 
campaign. Yet he was hardly alone in undertaking such a task. While he worked to dismantle the 
welfare state through his reform efforts as governor, his expansion of the EITC, and his support 
of the AFDC’s dissolution, social scientists and Republicans were just as instrumental in pushing 
through measures that would result in the Personal Responsibility Act. While social scientists 
like Ellwood proposed policy recommendations that would make it in the final bill, Republicans 
worked to get the legislation passed in Congress. New Democrats and African Americans were 
also pivotal to welfare reform, as they even supported its more punitive aspects. The driving 
rationale behind their support of welfare reform was the belief that welfare contributed to 
dependency and broken families among poor people of color, an idea that bears the imprint of 
underclass ideology. 
Conclusion 
 As we have seen, the underclass is not simply a concept that developed in a vacuum. 
Rather, it is an ideology whose evolution was aided by social scientists, policymakers, and 
politicians who were trying to come to grips with the countless social problems that poor urban 
blacks faced in postwar America. While blacks had attained their civil rights, these actors 
predicted that they would face challenges in terms of their preparedness of being equal citizens. 
This is not to suggest that their attitudes about blacks made them racist in the pejorative sense of 
the term. Indeed, individuals like Kennedy and Moynihan were lifelong liberal Democrats who 
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were committed to the idea that blacks should have the same civil and legal rights as other 
American citizens. Yet their tendency to link blacks’ lack of preparedness to culture and 
behavior caused them to ignore broader changes in the American economy that were the real 
cause of many of the social problems they faced. Such an oversight ensured that blacks would 
continue to feel the negative effects of these changes. 
 Conservative Republicans’ embrace of underclass ideology during the Reagan years 
cannot be seen in isolation from political and economic developments that started in the late 
1970s. As deindustrialization and globalization began to displace working-class African 
Americans from industrial jobs, crime, dependency, and other signs of “social pathology” started 
to become more common in black urban areas. Underclass scholars like Murray argued that the 
welfare state encouraged such antisocial behavior because it kept individuals (especially poor 
minorities) from seeking out jobs and building nuclear, two-parent families. Such a rationale 
went hand-in-hand with the emerging neoliberal consensus, which tended to attribute social ills 
to individuals’ lack of personal responsibility and commitment to family and community. In this 
way, neoliberalism bolstered underclass ideology’s appeal to conservatives by complimenting 
and reinforcing many of the latter’s central tenets.  
 Underclass ideology found bipartisan support during the Clinton years. This is not to 
suggest that it did not shape liberal Democrats’ attitudes about the poor prior to the Clinton 
presidency. As Daryl Carter notes, Democrats like Alice Rivlin and Barbara Blum were 
members of an anti-welfare group known as the “working seminar” as early as 1986, which 
“linked welfare with behavioral dysfunction and dependency” rather than political economy.88 
Yet it did not become a central facet of Democratic ideology until Clinton’s election. Clinton 
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drew on underclass ideology to advocate for draconian crime prevention and welfare reform 
measures that had a negative impact on poor people of color. 
 It was within such a political milieu, where underclass ideology had become 
“hegemonic,” that black liberals began to change how they thought about black social issues.89  
Whereas they would have been more likely to tie these issues to broader political and economic 
forces prior to the 1980s, by the 1990s, they, like their contemporaries, believed that such issues 
were rooted in blacks’ supposed innate behavioral and cultural traits. As will be explored in more 
depth in the next chapter, for instance, Rev. Jesse Jackson sponsored a summit in early 1994 that 
sought to develop behavioral solutions to crime and violence in black urban areas.90 Even former 
president Barack Obama, who came of age as a politician during the Clinton years, has also 
shown to be influenced by underclass ideology. Arguing that blacks in urban areas are “trapped 
by their own self-destructive behaviors,” Obama offered several prescriptions for solving the 
poverty dilemma in these areas in his book The Audacity of Hope, including discouraging 
women from having children out-of-wedlock and fostering responsible men.91  
 This black liberal embrace of underclass ideology laid the foundation for a conservative 
shift in African-American politics in the 1990s. Black liberals’ belief in behavioral solutions to 
black social issues allowed black conservative factions like the Nation of Islam, who had also 
embraced similar ideas but remained on the fringes of black politics, to become a significant part 
of black politics by this period. Both black liberals and the Nation employed behavioral 
measures to challenge gangsta rap and its supposed exacerbation of these issues. Thus, black 
censorship is essential to understanding this shift. 
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CHAPTER II: BLACK LIBERAL REPONSES TO GANGSTA RAP, 1993-2000 
 In 1995, People magazine published a cover story on C. Delores Tucker and her 
involvement in the gangsta rap censorship movement. Tucker, who by then had been a part of the 
movement for two years, lamented about the negative effects that the genre supposedly had on 
African-American listeners. She recalled how her teenage nephew dropped out of high school  
and impregnated his girlfriend shortly after he started listening to the music. ‘“His behavior 
started changing,’” she said. ‘“He tore down his art on the walls and the album covers went up. 
He started doing everything [the rappers] do.’”92 
 This tendency to link African Americans’ consumption of gangsta rap with antisocial 
behavior was not uncommon. Rather, it was reflective of a conservative political culture that had 
come to tie black social issues to pathology. By the 1990s, black liberals like Tucker had begun 
to disavow federal social service programs and instead put their faith in grassroot measures 
meant to redress blacks’ supposed behavioral deficiencies. Whether they were aware of it or not, 
their attitudes were informed by a belief that crime, delinquency, dependency, poverty, and a 
host of other social issues were a result of blacks’ (especially poor, urban blacks) moral 
shortcomings rather than economic changes and the federal government’s growing indifference 
to poor people. 
 Therefore, it is not surprising that black liberals would seek out gangsta rap censorship as 
an avenue for resolving these issues. As the genre started to grow in popularity in the early 
1990s, they started to speak out against what they perceived to be a correlation between its 
popularity among African Americans and their tendency to exhibit social pathologies like 
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criminal behavior and sexual promiscuity. Tucker, for instance, was a permanent fixture at 
rallies, corporate board meetings, and congressional hearings that dealt with the genre’s impact 
on listeners. Others like Rev. Calvin O. Butts used his church as a bully pulpit to speak out 
against the genre and was a frequent commentator on talk shows and music programs that 
discussed the genre. 
 This chapter examines their responses to gangsta rap from 1993 to 2000. It looks at four 
related issues that the genre’s opponents felt the genre had a role in promoting among its 
African-American audience: violence, crime, sexual promiscuity, and family disorganization. By 
1993, black criminality and violence had become hot button issues among black liberals, and 
they were committed to using censorship as a means of suppressing them. They addressed 
several facets of these issues, including black-on-black violence, mass incarceration, violence 
against women, and urban violence. A common thread linking their criticisms of the genre in this 
vein and advocacy of censorship was a belief that it encouraged these conditions and that 
preventative measures that stressed behavioral readjustment were an essential remedy.  
 The chapter then looks at how censors responded to gangsta rap that sexually degraded 
black women. Arguing that such portrayals of black women ran counter to proper feminine 
behavior, censors sought to pursue strategies that would deter black girls from embracing the 
sexual stereotypes associated with the genre, like shoring up their morale. 
 Censors also explored the supposed connection between the genre and dysfunctional 
black families. In keeping with the conservatism of the times, censors generally traced social 
pathologies like growing teenage pregnancy rates, absent or unfit fathers, and unruly children to 
the breakdown of the black family. Their criticisms tended to eschew economic interpretations of 
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inequality and its human toll and instead identified gangsta rap as a major contributor to social 
decay. 
Crime/Violence 
Motivated by concerns about the anti-crime bill’s impact on black incarceration, several 
black politicians, religious leaders, civil rights leaders, and academics met at a Washington 
conference organized by Rev. Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition in January 1994 to develop 
alternative strategies for reducing violence and criminality in black urban areas. Many at the 
conference agreed that black-on-black violence and homicide were two issues that had to receive 
top priority if any serious measures to redress violence and crime were to be taken. Statistics 
presented at the conference reinforced the need for effective measures: according to FBI reports, 
8,000 black men on average were murdered by other black men annually at a 90% rate. The 
reports also revealed that 60% of juveniles arrested on homicide charges in 1993 were African-
American males.93 
In response, conference participants proposed several strategies to combat rising crime 
rates and violence in black communities. While many stressed the need for more jobs, others 
proposed developing mentorship programs. One such program was the Coalition’s “Reclaim Our 
Youth” program, which would be aimed at remanding first-time offenders to mentors who would 
be trained in churches. For organizations like the Rainbow Coalition, the appeal of mentorship 
programs as a remedy to crime and violence was informed by a belief that these issues stemmed 
from blacks’ behavioral deficiencies. As Rev. Graylan Ellis-Hagler  lamented: “[f]or too long, 
churches have conducted their worship services, said their prayers, supported fellowship 
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societies, and closed their doors to the outside world…As a consequence of shutting out the 
world, an underclass has developed that has been invisible to the church.94 
One participant who also stressed behavioral solutions to black crime and violence was 
Tucker. Up until the early 1990s, nothing in her career suggested that she would become a vocal 
critic of the genre. Born in Philadelphia in 1927 and raised in a Baptist household, Tucker 
attended Temple University but dropped out to open an employment agency for black southern 
migrants in the city.95 She first became politically active during the Civil Rights Movement and 
was later appointed Philadelphia’s Secretary of State in 1971, becoming the first African 
American to hold the position. She helped found the National Political Congress of Black 
Women (NPCBW) in 1984, an organization aimed at increasing black women’s representation in 
the federal government. She also became its national chair in 1992.96 
 Tucker spoke on the second day of the conference, which focused on violence against  
black women. During her speech, Tucker argued that gangsta rap encouraged black males to  
commit acts of violence against black women. She also suggested that there was a direct  
correlation between gangsta rap and rising homicide rates in black communities. Much of her  
criticism was directed towards Snoop Doggy Dogg’s debut album Doggystyle, which was  
quickly becoming popular among black and white audiences.97 
 This was not the first time that Tucker addressed these issues. In 1992, she helped 
organize the NPCBW’s Entertainment Commission with entertainers Melba Moore and Dionne 
Warwick, Billboard magazine writer Terri Rossi, and Von Alexander, its director. Tucker 
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decided to form the organization after female secretaries and executives in the music industry 
approached her with concerns about the sexist and misogynistic lyrics in gangsta rap.98 The 
Commission had specific goals in mind: 
(1) To seek to eliminate internal blockage in the industry that currently and most 
obviously prevents African-Americans from achieving equal opportunities as artists and 
decision-makers; (2) To mobilize African-Americans in the industry to join the struggle 
to resolve critical issues affecting African-American communities, particularly in the 
areas of education and health, where so many serve as role models and spokespersons; 
AND (3) To offer strategic suggestions and solutions for reshaping and maintaining 
positive images to preserve our dignity and heritage for our youth … INSTEAD of 
continuously exposing our youth to negative media that distort their images of 
male/female relationships, undermine the stability of our families, communities and 
nation by encouraging violence, abuse and sexism as acceptable behaviors, and 
perpetuates the cycle of low self-esteem of African-American youth.99 
 
 While misogynistic lyrics were the main impetus for the Commission’s decision to   
pursue censorship, it was also concerned with how rappers supposedly encouraged African  
Americans to commit violent, criminal acts. These claims were not entirely without merit. In  
1992, for instance, Ronald Ray Howard, a 19-year-old African-American male, was convicted of  
shooting and killing a Huston state trooper during a traffic stop. During his trial, he told the jury  
that he was listening to Tupac Shakur’s debut album 2Pacalyspe Now, which he claimed  
influenced him to commit the murder. His lawyer also argued that Howard was a ‘“rap addict  
who lived, breathed and worshiped’” the violent lifestyle portrayed in gangsta rap.100 
 The Commission was also concerned about how so many young African Americans  
looked up to rappers who committed violent acts. In 1993, for instance, Snoop was brought up  
on murder charges for his involvement in an altercation that resulted in the shooting death of a  
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young man. Tupac was also charged with shooting two off-duty police officers in Atlanta,  
Georgia and sexually assaulting a young woman in a hotel room that same year.101 
 Concerned with the violent and criminal behavior associated with gangsta rappers and  
their music, the Commission reached out to Senators Cardiss Collins and Carol Moseley-Braun  
to organize congressional hearings that would assess the impact of gangsta rap on youth 
violence.102 The first of these hearings were held on February 11, 1994. Presided over by Collins, 
the hearing featured commentary from academics, journalists, and people involved in the 
television and the music industry. Tucker was one of the many speakers. In her testimony, she 
stressed that gangsta rap influenced black males to engage in self-destructive behavior that 
would lead them on the path to prison. To prove her point, Tucker read a letter from a Virginia  
prisoner who blamed his imprisonment on the genre: 
   Rappers… made it sound so good and look so real (that) I would drink and    
smoke drugs just like on the video, thinking that was the only way I could be   
somebody…My hood girls--became hoes and bitches. What’s so bad is that they  
accepted it. You know why? Because they put themselves in the video, too, and 
the guns, money, cars, drugs, and men became reality. Look where this kind of 
thinking has gotten me…facing 25 years to life in jail.103 
  
 Tucker also made connections between gangsta rap and crime at the second hearing on  
February 23, 1994. Unlike many advocates of crime prevention during this period, Tucker used  
her testimony as an opportunity to highlight the crime bill’s inability to effectively suppress  
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black crime. Describing the bill as a “short-term initiative,” she urged Congress to adopt  
“long-term and preventative measures” for black crime by curtailing the sale of gangsta rap. She  
also expressed concerns that children who did not have positive role models were the most 
receptive to the genre’s negative influences and would “trigger a crime wave of epidemic  
proportions.”104 
 To suppress the influence of gangsta rap on black youth, Tucker proposed that Congress  
create “private-public partnerships” that would be aimed at establishing boarding schools for at- 
risk black youth. She hoped that such schools would be modeled after Girard College in  
Philadelphia. Founded in 1848 by Stephen Girard, a French immigrant, Girard College was a  
boarding school that only initially admitted school-aged, poor white males, though the school  
became integrated in 1968. She explained that the proposed schools would have “‘Youth-Town’”  
residential centers, which would have programs to prevent at-risk children from committing  
crimes and rehabilitation programs to help nonviolent first offenders.105  
 While Tucker’s criticisms of gangsta rap hint at an embrace of underclass ideology, she  
often made it clear that it had a direct influence on her thinking about the genre. She often gave  
speeches where she discussed the deleterious effects of gangsta rap on African-American youth.  
In one of these speeches, Tucker quoted an article about the black underclass to make a case that  
the genre contributed to the growth of a violent black underclass: “‘Soon, 14 million poor  
children will become 14 million unskilled uneducated, angry dangerous adults. There will not be  
enough jails, enough bullets, enough quick-fix federal programs. There will be them and an  
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older, feebler generation increasingly dependent on us. They will blot out the sky, foul the air,  
make the water unfit to drink. They will steal tomorrow. They are time bombs.”’106 
 Tucker was not the only figure who drew connections between gangsta rap and black  
violence. Another was Rev. Calvin O. Butts. Butts joined Harlem’s Abyssinian Baptist Church  
as a youth minister in 1972. He quickly became known for his activism, founding the Abyssinian  
Development Corporation in 1989, an organization that was geared toward community  
development in Harlem. He was also known for taking a stance against issues he felt lead to  
depravity among African-Americans. In 1992, for instance, he painted over billboards that  
advertised cigarettes and alcohol because he believed they intentionally targeted black 
neighborhoods. It is no wonder, then, that he would target gangsta rap, which, as one 
commentator said, “‘is consistent with the kind of mission [he] is on.”’107 
 Butts garnered national attention when he tried to steamroll a pile of rap cassettes and  
CDs in front of his church in 1993. He did so as a protest to gangsta rap, which he felt did   
nothing to redeem African-American communities and portrayed blacks in a negative light. 
While many supported Butts’s measure, others were opposed to it, arguing that whites who  
owned record companies and music video stations should be to blame for perpetuating negative  
images of African Americans.108 
 Butts’s actions were partly motivated by a desire to reduce violence in black 
communities. Much like Tucker, Butts believed that gangsta rap was a central cause of growing  
black violence. Rarely did his criticisms of the genre include any acknowledgement of broader  
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economic trends as contributing factors in causing the violence. In 1993, for instance, a parent- 
teacher association invited Butts to speak at a New York high school about the rise of violence  
among black youth. With “hardly a mention of poverty or joblessness,” as one reporter noted,  
Butts proceeded to blame the rise of violence on gangsta rap. He then told parents that they  
should collaborate with schools and churches to ‘“[build] character and [teach] values”’ as a way  
of deterring black children from violent behavior.109 
 Butts’s and Tucker’s calls to use schools and churches to curb antisocial behavior among  
black youth was not the only tactic black liberals employed to combat gangsta rap’s supposed  
negative influence. Many also sought to counter its influence by steering black males away from   
deviant behavior. The New York Leadership Alliance is a case-in-point. The Alliance was a  
group started by prominent African-Americans, including radio personality Bob Law and New  
York Councilman Charles Barron. Its goal was to combat domestic violence and other forms of  
maltreatment of African-American women.110 As a testament to his commitment to shaping  
black men’s behavior, who were thought to be the cause of such problems, Law served on the  
Executive Council of the Million Man March, an event that had the same goal in mind.111 
 Law, Barron, and others started the group in response to attacks in Central Park initiated 
by young men against women. One of those, in June 2000 after the Puerto Rican Day Parade, 
elicited great media attention. Many women told reporters that they were groped, sprayed with 
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water, and had their clothes torn off. At least 17 people were arrested in connection with the 
attacks.112 
 Law and Barron believed that gangsta rap’s portrayal of women was a major impetus for  
black involvement in the attacks. Naturally, they called for ‘“economic sanctions’ against music  
companies producing rap music that denigrates women.’” Law believed that black men were  
susceptible to negative attitudes about women promoted in the genre, and therefore more likely  
to be violent towards them, because their communities lacked role models to offer them guidance  
on how to behave properly. He therefore asserted that the “challenge nonetheless remains for  
responsible black men to step up now and provide a model for what men and fathers should  
be.”113 
 While Bob and Law publicly condemned gangsta rap, individuals like Rev. Benjamin  
Chavis had a more positive outlook on the genre. A civil rights activist, Chavis gained national  
attention in the 1970s as one of the Wilmington Ten, who were ten individuals accused of  
firebombing a white-owned grocery store in Wilmington, N.C. during a civil rights protest in  
1971. In 1993, he assumed leadership of the NAACP, becoming the youngest person ever to do  
so. From the start, Chavis hoped to use his position to broaden the NAACP’s appeal to diverse  
segments of the African-American community. One way he sought to do this was by embracing  
gangsta rap.114 For instance, he hosted a music forum where he declared that the organization  
would “fight for the right of rappers to rap about the hard realities of life in a society permeated  
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by racial oppression and exploitation." He was also instrumental in getting Tupac nominated  
for a NAACP Image Award in 1994, a decision that the NPCBW harshly criticized.115   
 Chavis’s enthusiasm for the genre was not shared by the rest of the national NAACP.  
There was dispute within the organization with many of the policies Chavis was pursuing,  
especially his support of gangsta rap. A few days after Chavis’s rap forum, for instance,  
the organization released a public statement condemning gangsta rap for its promotion of  
violence.116 
 The NAACP’s Maryland chapter also seemed convinced that gangsta rap encouraged 
antisocial behavior among blacks. The chapter’s executive officers did a study that assessed the  
growth of black dependency and crime in the state. While the organization believed that limiting  
welfare could curb dependency, it also concluded that one of the best ways to suppress crime  
was to limit the influence of gangsta rap. To this end, it also proposed a hearing to assess the  
genre’s impact on black listeners.117 
 Critics also used public rallies as forums for denouncing the genre. One article in the  
New York Amsterdam News describes how William Tucker, C. Delores Tucker’s husband,  
organized a NPCBW rally outside of the Apollo Theater to protest Time Warner’s merger with  
EMI Music Group, a company that distributed gangsta rap records. Group demonstrations were a  
common tactic that Tucker and her supporters employed to protest companies that distributed  
gangsta rap. They had been arrested throughout the 1990s for holding demonstrations outside of  
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Tower Records retail stores in Pennsylvania.118 During this demonstration, William echoed  
familiar arguments about gangsta rap and its connection to black crime. Arguing that the genre  
“‘glorifies anti-social behavior in African-American men,”’ he noted that black male 
incarceration began to skyrocket in 1992 and 1993 when gangsta rap was becoming popular.119 
 While it was not uncommon for censors to make connections between gangsta rap, crime, 
and violence, some went to greater lengths than others. Such was the case with Nathan McCall. 
McCall was a writer for the Washington Post. In 1993, he published an article that looked at the 
genre’s influence on black youth. In many ways, it reads less like an op-ed and more like a 
pseudo-sociological study of the genre’s effects on black behavior. 
 First, he argued that black violence and crime were consequences of gangsta rap and 
negative social influences. He contended that while the genre was relatively “harmless” to most 
listeners, it could have a negative impact on “at risk” black youth, whom he suggests tended to 
be more receptive to gangsta rap due to “complex social factors,” like “public apathy, parental 
neglect, [and] the allure of drugs and guns.”120 
He also blamed the supposed surge of violence in black rural areas on the genre. He 
explained that the growing accessibility of gangsta rap in these areas coincided with the 
“unexplained change in the values and behavior” of their populations, which had been “cut off  
geographically from violent urban influences.”121 
Lastly, he drew on statistics to make a case for gangsta rap’s supposed deleterious effects  
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on black behavior. He asserted that in Washington alone, from 1988-1990, black juveniles who  
were arrested on homicide charges rose from 26% to 67%. On a national level, he noted that 
black juvenile killings had almost doubled since 1984 and that violent crimes among them had 
risen by almost 40%. He also noted how this increase in violence and criminality occurred when 
gangsta rap was growing in popularity. He concluded by suggesting that concerned individuals  
and groups pursue censorship to negate the genre’s negative influence on black youth.122 
These examples show that censors often paralleled each other in their criticisms of 
gangsta rap. They argued that the genre was responsible for increasing rates of black violence, 
criminality, and incarceration and often provided statistics to make their case. Yet their criticisms 
have distinct elements that speak to underclass ideology. 
C. Delores Tucker’s and Butt’s proposals for inoculating blacks from gangsta rap’s 
negative influence were based on a belief that violence and crime in black communities were 
driven by antisocial behavior. They argued that the best way to challenge these issues was by 
supporting preventative measures that were aimed at altering behavior. Yet this caused them to 
ignore how economic factors exacerbated such issues. John Clegg and Adaner Usmni, for 
instance, note that the increase in property and violent crimes among African Americans in 
central cities between 1960 and 1995 could be attributed to factors like deindustrialization, 
automation, and a lack of funding for social services.123 Notwithstanding such evidence, Tucker 
and Butts instead saw violence and crime as indicators of social pathology. Therefore, their 
criticisms of the genre can be linked to underclass ideology. 
 
122McCall, “My Rap.” 





While Tucker and Butts put their faith in schools and churches to shape black behavior, 
censors like William Tucker, Law, and Barron took a different route. They each argued that 
gangsta rap was responsible for increasing rates of violence and criminal activity among black 
males while Law specifically expressed a belief that fostering conformity among them should 
accompany any efforts to censor the genre. This suggests that they believed that black crime and 
violence were largely the fault of black males who exhibited pathological behavior, which, like 
Tucker’s and Butts’s criticisms, cannot be divorced from underclass discourse.   
Underclass ideology also informed McCall’s insights on gangsta rap and its influence on 
African Americans. Underlying his arguments was an assumption that blacks who came from 
dysfunctional and urban communities were prone to violent, criminal behavior, which is a central 
tenet of underclass ideology. 
Sexual Promiscuity 
 Aside from crime and violence, censors were also concerned with the excessive 
misogynistic themes in gangsta rap. While they expressed their disapproval of lyrics from black 
male rappers that cast black women’s sexual behavior in a negative light, they also directed their 
criticisms toward black female rappers who supposedly projected black female sexual 
stereotypes. For example, Bytches With Problems, a female rap duo that was often compared to  
2 Live Crew, were known for songs like “Is the Pussy Still Good?” and “Two Minute Brother,”  
which glorified sexually-promiscuous behavior among women.124 Troubled by such lyrics and  
the messages they conveyed, David Christian of the Tampa Bay Male Club, a program where  
professional black men mentored inner-city black boys, commented that ‘“these young women  
are not presenting themselves as very ladylike when they go on stage singing, ‘Shake baby  
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shake, shake baby boom.’”125 
 Censors were also concerned that young black girls internalized these sexual messages,  
which seemed to affect their view of themselves and their behavior. In 1995, for instance, a  
reporter interviewed five black girls about gangsta rap. Not only did they express that they saw  
nothing wrong with rappers referring to them as bitches, but they also revealed that “they don’t 
hesitate to shake their rumps” when listening to certain songs.126 
 Censors also argued that gangsta rap was problematic because it produced stereotypes  
about black women that were antithetical to what they believed to be genuine roles for black  
women. The Black Leadership Forum (BLF), which is a consortium of black civil rights  
organizations founded in the 1970s, opined that the genre corrupted the image of black women,  
whom it believed should be seen as mothers and nurturers: “Misogynistic rap and videos… 
present a destructive, unhealthy, and unacceptable model of black male and female interaction. 
An entertainment industry which grows wealthy through verbal and visual assaults on African  
American mothers, daughters, and sisters—the primary transmitters of our culture and the  
principal guarantors of our future generations—can only be viewed as a participant of black  
genocide.”127     
 To counter such imagery and its corollary effects on black female sexual behavior, Chloe 
Coney, who was the director of the Lee Davis Neighborhood Development Corporation in  
Tampa, Florida, went about enacting measures that would affect black girls’ morale. She often  
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complained how “inner-city girls raised in fatherless homes” often accepted adverse treatment  
from African-American boys in their neighborhood, like being called derogatory names.  
Opposing what she saw as a focus on African-American males and the issues they faced, Coney  
sought to develop a program where professional black woman would “help at-risk girls blossom  
into self-confident adults.” She argued that such a strategy was necessary because black girls’  
“self-esteem levels have dropped down to zero. If we teach our girls to value themselves, then  
maybe they won't look to rappers, and other men, to gauge their self-worth.”128 
 Through their criticisms of and efforts to negate gangsta rap’s negative influence on  
black female behavior, censors often reinforced conservative sensibilities about black women. 
Failing to consider black women’s issues in the context of racial and gender inequality, they  
instead stressed the importance for them to adopt conservative behavior and gender roles; that is,  
to be chaste, mothers, and nurturers. Therefore, it can be argued that black liberal censorship in  
regard to sexual promiscuity was grounded in criticisms of black female sexual  behavior that  
were popular in underclass and welfare discourse. 
Family Disorganization 
 Much like their ideas on crime, violence, and sexual promiscuity, censors believed that 
gangsta rap had a negative impact on black families. They often argued that the genre 
undermined family values. Such a critique seems to have partly motivated Tucker’s censorship 
efforts. When she contacted Carol Moseley-Braun about organizing a congressional hearing on 
gangsta rap’s impact on listeners, for instance, she stated in a letter to her that black children 
were being ‘“bombarded with so many negative messages that undermine positive family values 
[and] our authority as parents.”’129 
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 Tucker took her critiques a step further at the 1994 anti-crime conference. Drawing on 
history, Tucker suggested that the misogyny displayed in gangsta rap did more to cause the 
moral erosion of the black family than any of its past struggles:  
  For 400 years, profit came before principle, as black women bore the brunt of  
  slave masters’ degradation. But even through the Middle Passage, the peculiar  
  institution of slavery, the spirit of black women and their families could not be  
  broken. Today, however, through the lyrics of rappers, who display no respect for  
  women, no respect for families, and little respect for themselves, the souls of our  
  sisters are being destroyed and so to their progeny.130 
 
 While Tucker languished over gangsta rap’s role in the moral decline of the black family, 
critics like Butts were more concerned with how it supposedly encouraged black teenage 
pregnancy. In a CBS interview, for instance, Butts complained how he often saw young girls in 
central Harlem, a predominantly black community, imitating the sexual behavior displayed in rap 
videos. He argued that there was a direct relationship between such behavior and out-of-wedlock 
births among black teenage girls.131 
 This concern about the relationship between teenage pregnancy and gangsta rap also 
informed measures that the Minneapolis Urban League took to deal with the issue in Minnesota. 
In 1980, black teenagers in the state were three times more likely to get pregnant than their white 
peers, yet it had increased to five times by 1999. The state also ranked in the top five for states 
with high rates of black teenage pregnancy, despite having one of the lowest overall and white 
teen pregnancy rates in the nation.132 
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 Many critics argued that poverty could help explain the gap. They suggested that black 
adolescents in the state became pregnant sooner because they tended to come from low-income 
neighborhoods with limited prospects for the future: “If teens live in poor neighborhoods 
surrounded by crime, drugs, unemployment and poor schools, what future can they imagine for 
themselves?” asked Yusef Mgeni, president of the Urban Coalition, an advocacy and research 
group for issues affecting low-income people in the Twin Cities.133 
 While many conceded that poverty was a central cause of rising black teenage pregnancy 
rates, others paradoxically sought out behavioral solutions to the issue. Minnesota’s Health 
Department, for instance, founded the African-American Teen Pregnancy Prevention Project, 
which was tasked with seeking out preventative, “culturally specific programs” for African-
American teenage girls. One such program was the Heavy, Intense Prevention Program for 
Homies, Oakies, Players and Perpetrators (which ironically spelled out the acronym “HIPP 
HOPP”). Directed by Lolita Davis Carter, a program supervisor at the Minneapolis Urban 
League, it was run through five junior high schools and high schools in the city. In addition to 
having a panel of teen moms and lectures on family planning, it also had a week-long class on 
teaching girls how gangsta rap demeaned African-American women. “At the beginning of the 
class, they're like, ‘Gangsta rap is down…it's good she's wearing a g-string because we want to 
see her shake her bootie, But by the end of the class, it's different. They're saying, ‘Maybe some 
of the gangsta rap is not respectful to African-American women,’” Carter said of the class’s 
effect on students.134    
 Teenage pregnancy was not the only family-related issue that censors believed was 
caused by gangsta rap. They also believed that the genre played a role in depriving black families 
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of good fathers. As mentioned before, censors believed that the genre encouraged criminal 
behavior among African-American males. This in turn, they believed, had a direct effect on their 
abilities to be fathers. In a speech given at a NPCBW awards brunch, for instance, Tucker 
explained that the organization had a “covenant” to keep with society to “sustain [the] respect 
and dignity of [black] men.” She believed that its mission was being compromised by “elements 
[that] conspired to denigrate [black] men thereby causing the breakup of families.” She believed 
that black men were unable to carry out their responsibilities as fathers because they were 
afflicted by the “‘3P Plague’-probation, prison, [and] parole.”135 
 While Tucker does not specify what “elements” left black homes without good fathers, 
her commentary elsewhere suggests that she saw gangsta rap as a central cause. She expressed  
her concerns at a Time Warner stockholder meeting in 1996. After her successful attempt to get  
Time Warner to sell Interscope, she bought stocks in the company and became a regular fixture 
at stockholder meetings. She often used these meetings as opportunities to protest the company’s 
continued investment in the genre.136 At the 1996 meeting, she complained about the genre’s role 
in depriving black families of good fathers. After berating Warner’s C.E.O. Gerald Levin for 
promoting music that was thought to encourage black male criminality, she suggested that this in 
turn led black fathers to either be absent from the home or unfit to raise their children: “I told 
him about the black males-25 percent are either in jail or under some form of judicial regulation. 
I said…’how are we going to raise a race of people with no men?’”137 
 Critics also believed that gangsta rap affected black males’ ability to be fathers by  
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providing them with a false sense of manhood. Leonard Pitts, a newspaper columnist, explored 
this in an article written for the San Jose Mercury News. He explained that in response to coming  
from fatherless homes, many young black males internalized the antisocial themes prevalent in 
the genre, causing them to adopt a callous demeanor. He further complained that their desire to 
present themselves in this manner left little room for them to learn what it meant to be 
responsible fathers.138 
 Aside from looking at the genre’s effect on black teenaged girls and males, censors also 
argued that the genre corrupted black children. Tucker believed that children who did not come 
from strong, two-parent families were more susceptible to its antisocial influences. In one 
speech, for instance, she decried how black children influenced by the genre, who had no 
understanding of the “‘traditional family,’” were much like a young black man she met when she 
was still Secretary of State, who “either had no home at all or come from a dysfunctional home 
where the parents suffer from debilitating social or mental ailments.”’139 
 Tucker reiterated her concerns at a news conference with Bennett and Senator Joseph 
Lieberman.  Lieberman joined Tucker and Bennett’s anti-rap crusade in 1996, when they called  
for Warner, BMG, PolyGram, Thorn-EMI, and Sony Music to drop gangsta rappers from their  
labels.140 Tucker used the conference as a platform to discuss the genre’s debilitating effects on 
black children. Citing gangsta rap albums like Dogg Food, she opined that the genre had a 
negative influence on children who came from fatherless households and whose mothers were 
teenagers and on drugs. She also complained that her six-year-old grand-niece, who frequently 
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listened to the music, had become a “social leper” whom parents did not around their “decent 
children.”141 
 Like many who were swayed by the conservative political culture of the era, censors  
rarely looked at black teenage pregnancy from a socioeconomic viewpoint. As public health  
expert Arline Geronimus reasons, early pregnancy can be a rational choice for adolescents who  
come from poor, urban families. She argues that because black adolescents in these families tend  
to have shorter life expectancies and limited educational and employment opportunities, many 
might decide to have children young, since it would make it more likely that they would be able  
to raise them into adulthood with the support of an extended kin network. Censors, however,   
ignored how such factors might affect black adolescents’ childbearing options and instead   
viewed teenage pregnancy as “one in a constellation of pathological behaviors particularly  
engaged in by an urban, African American ‘underclass.’”142 
  Censors also thought about black fathers in terms of behavior. Their ideas preceded from  
the view that fathers were meant to be both leaders and financial providers in their families, and  
their failure to do so was indicative of family breakdown. Yet censors failed to consider how  
fathers’ inability to carry out these roles could be a result of socioeconomic factors. Geronimus 
notes that in poor black urban families, a child’s biological father is often absent or unable to be 
the sole breadwinner because they, like black adolescent girls, tend to have short life 
expectancies and low-wage jobs. In such instances, male relatives often “supplement or even  
substitute for parental support.”143 Censors’ willingness to instead link black males’  
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unpreparedness for fatherhood solely to pathology suggests that they were more so influenced by  
underclass ideology than the culture wars or a generational conflict.  
  Censors’ arguments about black children also reflect an influence of underclass 
ideology. They suggested that children who did not come from healthy, two-parent families were 
more likely to engage in antisocial behavior. Yet this view assumes that such families are the 
only ones that can effectively rear children. As alluded to before, extended kin networks often 
help to raise children in poor urban black families.  
Conclusion 
 At first glance, blaming major issues like crime, violence, sexual promiscuity, and  
family disorganization on a musical genre seems absurd. Yet when considering the political 
context of the era, one can begin to make sense of censors’ criticisms and their efforts to censor 
gangsta rap. In a political culture that had begun to retreat from its commitment to poor 
minorities and instead blame them for their own problems, censors began to reevaluate how they 
thought about and dealt with black social issues. They often identified pathological behavior as a 
cause of such issues. Given this, it seems reasonable that blacks would target gangsta rap, since it 
was a genre that was immensely popular among African Americans and, as previously shown, 
contained antisocial messages that some of its black listeners were receptive to.  
  The measures that censors took to subdue the negative influence of gangsta rap was 
predicated on a belief that bad behavior was a major impetus for black crime and violence. While 
it is true that crime and violence were becoming growing issues in black urban areas, censors 
often misdiagnosed their cause. As blacks in these areas were faced with increasing joblessness  
and poverty due to the shift from an industrial to an information technology economy, they were  
left with few options for gainful employment. Therefore, their turn to crime, and the violence  
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that accompanied it, were more so consequences of economic changes. Censors, however,  
pursued measures that were meant to target behavior rather than address these changes, which  
reflects the influence of underclass ideology on their thinking about the genre.   
 Censors also faulted gangsta rap for its sexualized depiction of black women because 
they believed that such imagery encouraged black girls to engage in inappropriate sexual 
behavior. The solution, therefore, was to build black girls’ self-respect and emphasize their roles 
as mothers and nurturers. Such themes were common in policy debates about welfare reform and 
the black underclass in the 1980s and 90s, where many were committed to suppressing sexual 
immorality among poor black women and enforcing their role as mothers in nuclear, two-parent 
families. In this sense, censors’ views on black female sexual promiscuity and gangsta rap can be 
seen in the context of underclass ideology and neoliberalism. 
  Censors also sidestepped the broader economic implications of issues affecting black  
families. Because of their socioeconomic status, poor, urban blacks often have approaches to  
family life that are uncommon in nuclear families, such as embracing teenage pregnancy, male  
kin taking on roles traditionally reserved for fathers, and extended kin networks taking an active  
role in nurturing children. Rather than seeing these as rational approaches to family life given  
their socioeconomic backgrounds, censors instead saw teenage pregnancy, fathers’ inability to  
lead their families, and the failure of two-parent families to rear children as evidence of  




CHAPTER III: THE NATION OF ISLAM’S RESPONSES TO GANGSTA RAP, 1995-2000 
 
On October 16, 1995, Rev. Jesse Jackson gave a speech at the Million Man March. The 
March, which was an event sponsored by the Nation of Islam (NOI) that urged black men to take  
responsibility for issues like crime, poverty, and family disorganization, seemed to be an ideal  
venue for Jackson. Since the early 1990s, personal responsibility and mentorship had been 
central themes of his anti-crime and anti-violence initiatives, and the March provided him with 
an opportunity to reiterate those themes. While his speech called on the federal government to 
address economic inequality among poor urban blacks, it also challenged black men to “stop 
[their] self-destructive behavior” and become better fathers and role models to at-risk black 
children.144  
 A few decades prior to this, Jackson speaking at an event sponsored by the NOI would 
have seemed unlikely, given the organization’s tenuous relationship with black liberals. Since the 
1960s, the Nation, a black separatist organization, had constantly been at odds with black  
liberals, who had sought out black progress through integration. By the mid-1990s, however, 
both were committed to the belief that pathological behavior was a major impetus for black 
inequality. 
 This new consensus in black politics was evident with the Nation’s involvement in the  
gangsta rap censorship movement. The Nation, like black liberals, believed that gangsta rap  
was one of the major causes of black pathology, and therefore directed its efforts towards  
censoring it. More so than its liberal counterparts, however, the Nation believed that the genre  
could be used to counter the social pathology that it believed characterized black life. 
 This chapter explores the NOI’s involvement in the censorship movement. First, it looks  
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at the scholarship on the NOI’s ideas about black social pathology, and demonstrates how it is  
insufficient in helping us understand the organization’s censorship efforts in the context of black  
politics in the 1990s and early 2000s. It then transitions into a discussion on the Million Man  
March. It looks at the March’s central ideas, their connection to black men, and how both the  
Nation and black liberals used them to justify censorship. 
 It then delves into the Nation’s censorship efforts amid the East Coast/West Coast feud.  
The Nation believed that the feud, which was a conflict between mainly East and West Coast  
rappers that ended after the shooting deaths of two prominent rap stars, contributed to a rise of ‘ 
crime and violence among their black listeners. Consequently, Nation members sought to counter  
the genre’s supposed negative influence through a variety of means, including peace rallies and  
summits.   
 The chapter also looks at how censors correlated their understanding of black women’s  
sexuality with the rap music they believed these women listened to. While it considers the NOI’s  
arguments about how the genre encouraged sexual promiscuity among black women, it also  
looks at similar arguments made during the Million Woman’s March, an event that was inspired 
by the Million Man March and grounded in conservative ideas about women’s roles. 
 It then looks at the NOI’s censorship efforts in relation to rap and the black family. It  
mainly looks at Farrakhan’s and C. Delores Tucker’s remarks on the subject in the context of the  
Million Family March, an event geared toward promoting family stability. 
 Lastly, it analyzes the music of two gangsta rappers who were influenced by the Nation  
during this period: Ice-T and Ice Cube. Both rappers made connections between behavior and the  
social issues that blacks faced, and are therefore essential in understanding how gangsta rappers  
could make music that was in tandem with the goals of NOI censorship. 
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The NOI and Black Pathology: A Literature Review 
 
 The scholarship on the NOI has attempted to make sense of the organization by exploring  
its many facets, including its relationship to broader black politics and nationalism, its ideas on  
gender roles, and its beliefs about black economic development. Scholars who have analyzed  
these themes, such as Robin D.G. Kelley, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, Clarence Lang, Dean  
Robinson, and Nikol G. Alexander-Floyd, have also looked at the organization’s thought on  
black pathology. By assessing their scholarship in this area, we can begin to see where it falls  
short on helping us understand how the NOI fits into the milieu of black politics in the 1990s and  
early 2000s. 
 Kelley briefly touches on the NOI’s ideology in his book Yo Mama DisFUNKtional! He  
locates the organization’s ideas about black social pathology in black self-help philosophy.  
Rooted in the ideas of figures like Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey, this ideology  
entails that blacks should work to find solutions to issues that afflict their communities. Its  
adherents often embrace the view that these issues stem from blacks’ moral flaws. He notes, for  
instance, that the NOI’s People Organized and Working for Economic Rebirth (POWER) sought  
to deter blacks from committing crimes and doing drugs in addition to addressing 
unemployment.145 
 Much like Kelley, Cha-Jua and Lang look at the NOI’s ideas about black pathology in a  
narrow racial context. They argue that such ideas are rooted in the organization’s embrace of  
militant black conservatism. Drawing on themes associated with monotheistic religions, this  
ideology holds that African Americans exhibit pathological behavior and are therefore in need of  
moral guidance from black elites. They also argue that this conservatism was clearly at play  
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during the Million Man March, since some of the major themes of the March were that blacks  
were morally “sick” and in need of “atonement.”146 
Unlike Kelley, Cha-Jua and Lang, who tend to look at the Nation’s ideas in a vacuum,  
Robinson connects the organization’s thought to broader American politics. In his book Black  
Nationalism in American Politics and Thought, for instance, Robinson argues that Farrakhan’s  
views on blacks “position him at the far-right end of the political spectrum” with white 
conservatives and the religious right.147 He further suggests that Farrakhan’s alignment with the  
far right has informed measures that the NOI has taken to redress black pathology from the 
1980s going forward. Like Kelley, he looks at POWER, and notes how Farrakhan believed that  
such an initiative would ‘“rebuild a stable black family life [and] drastically reduce the 
involvement of black people in crime and drugs.’”148 
More so than any of the previous-mentioned scholars, Alexander-Floyd ties the Nation’s  
ideas to underclass ideology. In an article that explores gender and black nationalism, Alexander- 
Floyd asserts that the patriarchal message central to the Million Man March grew out of a “black  
cultural pathology paradigm.” She argues that the paradigm, or “narrative,” posits that the many  
social problems that African Americans face stem from female-headed households. Therefore,  
any attempts to resolve these issues must include measures to promote patriarchal black families.  
She ties the narrative to different episodes that shaped the development of underclass ideology,  
like the publication of Moynihan’s Negro Family and Raegan’s speeches on the “welfare 
queen.”149 
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While each of these authors greatly contribute to our understanding of the Nation’s  
ideology, their analyses is somewhat limited. They fail to consider, for instance, how the 
Nation’s censorship efforts can be used to understand the growing consensus on inequality in  
black politics in the 1990s and 2000s. Coupled with black liberal censorship efforts, the Nation’s  
efforts revealed a tendency in black politics to measure black inequality in terms of individual  
behavior rather than lack of opportunity. Therefore, looking at the Nation in this context 
illustrates the growing influence of neoliberalism on black politics during this period. It also  
captures the overall complexity of black politics, since it shows blacks’ conservatism despite  
their political orientation. 
Million Man March and Gangsta Rap 
 
 Spurred by a myriad of issues, including unemployment, crime, family dissolution, and  
blacks’ portrayal in the media, Farrakhan made a call for the Million Man March in 1995. As  
evidence of the broad support that the Nation had garnered from African Americans by the  
1990s, several African Americans of varying political orientations were involved in organizing  
the event. Benjamin Chavis, a liberal Democrat, served as the March’s national director.150  
Chavis, who had been ousted from his position in the NAACP for a sexual harassment scandal,  
would later convert to Islam and serve as the Nation’s East Coast Regional Minister.151 Maulana  
Karenga, a black nationalist, was another key player, serving on the March’s executive 
council.152  
 The March called for black men to practice “atonement, reconciliation, and  
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responsibility” in their daily lives. It stressed that black men should atone for their supposed  
moral deficiencies and strive to be “self-corrective” in their behavior.153 It also suggested that  
they reconcile their differences with others as a means of creating unity and solving issues in  
their communities. Finally, it called for “each Black man…to renew and expand [their]  
commitment to responsibility in personal conduct, in family relations and in obligations to the  
community.”154 
 The last theme struck a chord with the organizers of the March. They believed that 
 many of the social issues that African Americans faced stemmed from black men’s failure to be  
effective leaders and fathers. They therefore felt it was imperative to remind black men of their  
responsibilities:  
Some of the most acute problems facing the Black community within are those posed by 
Black males who have not stood up; that the caring and responsible father in the home; 
the responsible and future-focused male youth; security in and of the community; the 
quality of male/female relations, and the family’s capacity to avoid poverty and push the 
lives of its members forward all depend on the Black men’s standing up.155  
 
This message was not lost on black liberals. They believed that the lessons of the March 
could serve to inoculate blacks from gangsta rap’s negative influences. Tucker, for instance, 
stated that she supported the March’s goals to foster responsible black fathers and leaders. She 
hoped that such a move would counter attempts by the mass media to portray black men as 
antisocial and be “turned into a hurricane force to rid our communities of denigrating music” like 
gangsta rap.156 At a news conference attended by Tucker, Morris Shearin, a representative of a 
Washington NAACP locale, also hoped that the fervor created by the March would cause rappers 
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to be more responsible about the content they produced: “These rappers are serving the same role 
as Judas--to sell out what is decent in our community…[i]n the spirit of the Million Man March 
and as men, it is time to tell these boys that it's time to stand up.”157 
While Farrakhan also chastised gangsta rap for its content, he also believed that the genre 
had redeeming qualities. Arguing that the genre contributed to the spread of “degenerate culture” 
in American society, Farrakhan instead implored rappers to use their music to spread positive 
messages in black communities. In building off this theme, he had Marchers recite a pledge  
promising to only support black artists who worked toward this goal.158 
From these examples, we can see that the Nation and black liberals believed that the 
message of the March could convince rappers to stop promoting antisocial messages in their 
music, since they believed that such messages fueled black pathology. While this belief 
motivated much of the former’s censorship efforts, it seemed to be the most pronounced in its 
anti-violence and anti-crime measures, which were aimed at curtailing black male-on-male 
violence and crime.  
Crime/Violence 
 Farrakhan was not the only Nation member who commented on gangsta rap and its  
effects on listeners. Another was Conrad Muhammad. Born Conrad Tillard, Muhammad had  
been connected to the Nation as early as 1985, when he helped organize Farrakhan’s Madison  
Square Garden appearance that year. After serving as the Nation’s national student minister, 
Muhammad was appointed as leader of Muslim Mosque no.7. in Harlem in 1991. During his 
tenure as leader, he became known for mediating feuds between rappers, which earned him the 
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moniker “hip-hop minister.”159 He played an important role in trying to resolve the East 
Coast/West Coast hip-hop rivalry.  
 The East Coast/West Coast rivalry was a feud mainly between New York and Los- 
Angeles rappers. While the rivalry dates back to 1991, Bryan McCann argues that it started to 
intensify in 1994 after Tupac was robbed and shot in the lobby of Quad Studios in New York 
while Bad Boy CEO Sean “Puffy” Combs and his artist Biggie Smalls were there recording 
music. Believing Puffy and Smalls to be involved in the incident, Tupac proceeded to insult 
Smalls, the Bad Boy roster, and New York rappers in several diss tracks while other Los-
Angeles rappers made their own diss tracks aimed at New York rappers. This in turn caused New 
York rappers to respond with their own diss tracks. The rivalry began to settle down when both 
Shakur and Smalls were killed as a result of drive-by shootings in 1996 and 1997, 
respectively.160 
 Believing Shakur’s death to be the result of violence in the hip-hop community, 
Muhammad organized a memorial service to commemorate the slain rapper’s life and to  
reconcile the differences between feuding East and West Coast rappers.161 Billed as the “Hip- 
Hop Day of Atonement” by the Muslim leader, one source estimates that as many as 2,000  
people showed up for the event.162 While the event was meant to celebrate Shakur’s life,  
Muhammad also saw it as an opportunity for attendees to “atone for the self-destructive,  
genocidal lifestyle” that claimed his life. With such a focus on the harmful effects of gangsta rap  
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culture rather than Tupac himself, it comes of little surprise that one journalist described the  
event as  “less a memorial and more a lesson in the futility of "gangsta" values [and] street  
violence.”163 
 While a public reconciliation between East and West Coast rappers failed to take place, 
rappers in attendance were nevertheless inspired by the event’s anti-violence message. For  
instance, they signed a pledge swearing off using violent lyrics in their work.164 Rapper Q-Tip  
even criticized other male rappers for the violent and criminal themes in their music: “I think the  
problem comes from black men, especially," Q- Tip said. "We have to learn to be responsible,  
caring and conscious of the things we say.”165 
 Aside from encouraging rappers to change their lyrical content, Nation members also  
believed that Tupac’s life could be used to teach his African-American fans the dangers of  
emulating gangsta rap lyrics. Arthur Muhammad, a radio personality who emceed the Day of  
Atonement, was one such member. During the event, he urged attendees to discard the idea of  
“keeping it real,” a popular mantra in gangsta rap that he felt encouraged black listeners to  
engage in antisocial behavior: “If keeping it real means having a gun in your waistband, if  
keeping it real means debasing the black woman, if keeping it real means dropping out of high  
school, if keeping it real means using violence and drugs, then we ain't gonna keep it real, we  
gonna keep it right.”166 
 Echoing Arthur’s sentiments, Conrad also offered his thoughts about “keeping it real.” 
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He reasoned that black males often internalized this message because they took their cues on  
how to behave from gangsta rap rather than seeking out churches or schools for moral guidance.  
The absence of such guidance, Conrad further argued, increased the likelihood of black men  
being murdered by other black men.167 
 The Nation was not solely concerned with the lack of guidance among rappers’ black  
male fanbase. Its members also felt it necessary to act as a moral compass for rappers, many of  
whom they felt were led astray by the music industry. Conrad had such a relationship with the  
rapper Shyne, a New York-based rapper who was signed to Puffy’s Bad Boy label. In 1999, he  
was involved in a nightclub shooting that left three people wounded. At a news conference,  
Conrad lambasted record executives for failing to offer him and other young rappers proper  
guidance, without which, he argued, “leaves them prey to the pitfalls of the gangsta lifestyle.”168 
 In April 1997, Farrakhan organized a summit in Chicago that sought to quell the disputes 
that grew out of the East Coast/West Coast feud. Many of the rappers involved in the feud 
attended, including Snoop Dogg, Ice Cube, and Common Sense. In a press conference following 
the summit, Farrakhan asserted that the attendees had pledged to end their disputes with one 
another. He also explained that they would produce an album and tour that would commemorate 
Tupac and Biggie and promote atonement, reconciliation, and responsibility in black 
communities. He believed that these measures were necessary in “guiding our communities 
towards constructive behavior.”169  
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 Farrakhan also hoped to use open forums to address gangsta rap and its supposed 
negative effects on black behavior. Months after the meeting, for instance, Farrakhan offered to 
sponsor a “‘peace and atonement’” conference in Washington that would include panels 
featuring rappers, music executives, and Afeni Shakur, Tupac’s mother. It would also center 
around a panel called “Rappers for the Advancement of African People,” which would  
explore “how the music form itself has affected the lives of young people in causing violence  
and urban decay.”170 While there is no evidence to suggest that the album, tour, and conference 
ever went past the proposal stage, they reflected the NOI’s belief that gangsta rap could be a 
cause of, and remedy to, black social pathologies.  
 Around the time that Farrakhan was trying to settle the East/West Coast feud, Conrad  
was forging new ground as a hip-hop activist. After being ousted as leader of Mosque no. 7,  
Muhammad founded an organization that was geared toward promoting political activism among  
the hip-hop generation.  Called Conscious Hip-Hop Activism Necessary for Global 
Empowerment (CHHANGE), the organization sought to get young blacks involved in several  
politically-charged issues, from voter registration to police brutality.171  
 While the main goal of Muhammad’s organization was to encourage political activism  
among young African Americans, he also hoped that it could serve as an outlet for them to direct  
their energies toward more constructive channels. He felt that they spent too much of their time  
emulating gangsta rap, which he argued accounted for the high rates of mass incarceration, 
violence, sexual exploitation, and drug crimes among them. He therefore felt that his  
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organization could “give Black youth an alternative to the thug lifestyles glamorized in hip-hop  
videos.”172 
Sexual Promiscuity  
 
 Crime and violence were not the only issues that convinced the NOI to censor gangsta  
rap. Sexual promiscuity was also a target of its censorship efforts. In May 1997, for instance,  
Farrakhan convened a second hip-hop summit where he briefly touched on how the genre 
seemed to encourage young black girls to engage in sexually-promiscuous behavior. He argued 
that because rap made black girls think of themselves as “bitches and hoes,” it made it easier for 
them to be prostitutes.173 This example shows that with its criticisms of rap, the NOI, like black 
liberals, normally viewed sexual behavior through a gendered lens, since black girls and women 
were singled out for their promiscuity more so than their black male counterparts.  
 Concerns over black women’s behavior partially motivated the 1997 Million Woman  
March in Philadelphia. Inspired by the Million Man March, the event was organized by activists  
Phile Chionesu and Asia Coney and sought to address several issues facing black women,  
including their lack of professional development and homelessness.  Aside from its more  
practical goals, they also felt that the March needed to emphasize black women’s roles as  
nurturers, since they, as Coney put it, were “responsible for teaching morals and values 
of womanhood.”174 
 One person who spoke at the March was Sistah Souljah. Souljah was a Bronx rapper who 
was known for her inflammatory remarks about racial matters. In 1992, she attracted national  
attention for her remarks on the Los Angeles Riots. While commenting on the black-on-white  
 
172Dais, “CHHANGE.” 
173Louis Farrakhan, “Chicago Hip Hop Summit (2),” MP3 Audio, May 13, 1997, 32:43-33:57. 
174Asia Coney, “Remarks at the Million Woman March,” Vital Issues: The Journal of African American Speeches 7, 
no.4 (1997): 4-5. 
71 
 
violence during the Riots, Souljah asked during an interview that “if black people kill black  
people every day, why not have a week and kill white people…[d]o you think that somebody  
thinks white people are better, or above dying?”  Clinton condemned Souljah’s comments at a  
Rainbow Coalition meeting to distance himself from the radical views that tended to be  
associated with his party, which became known as a Sistah Souljah moment.175 
 At the March, Souljah spoke on the supposed connection between rap and black women’s 
sexual behavior. Condemning black women who practiced infidelity and appeared semi-nude  
in public, Souljah argued that they needed to concentrate on being respectable. She felt that their  
ability to do so was being jeopardized by female rappers like Lil’ Kim and Foxy Brown, whom  
she suggested taught them to define themselves in terms of their sexuality.176 
Family 
 
 In addition to crime, violence, and sexual promiscuity, the NOI also explored the  
connection between rap and the black family. At the April and May 1997 hip-hop summits, for  
instance, Farrakhan argued that rap had the potential to promote family stability. At the former,  
he urged rappers like Snoop Dogg to produce lyrics that would encourage black men to be better  
patriarchs in their families.177 At the May summit, he argued that rappers should discourage  
husbands from abusing their wives. 178 
 Seeking to promote the development of stable black nuclear families, the NOI went about  
organizing the Million Family March. In July 2000, Farrakhan held a press conference where he  
discussed his reasons for the March, which would be held in November that same year. He     
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argued that while such a march was needed as a response to the moral erosion of American 
 families, he admitted that he was particularly concerned about the erosion of black families.  
Like Moynihan, Farrakhan suggested that weak family structures led to other forms of social  
pathologies among blacks, including female-headed households, involvement in gangs and 
crime, and drug use. Therefore, he stressed that federal policy should be geared toward  
strengthening the family.179 
 Farrakhan also suggested that music played a significant role in the decline of family  
values. He stated, for instance, that such values were being undermined by the “cultural   
degeneracy” that was being pushed on children through music.180 While he does not specify what 
kind of music he was referring to, his sentiments about rap music expressed during the Million  
Man March make it likely that he was referring to the genre. 
 One of the March’s main supporters was Russell Simmons. A rap mogul, Simmons was  
responsible for rallying many of the rappers who attended and performed at the event. He  
believed that their participation in the March could help send a message that they supported the 
idea of building stronger families: “The rap community has always been one thing: real. They'll  
talk about how much money they're making…They'll brag about their sponsorship deal with  
Coca-Cola. So they also should also have guts enough to talk about family.”181 
 C. Delores Tucker was another figure who supported the March. In her speech at the  
event, she suggested that rap music weakened families’ abilities to effectively rear and nurture  
children by exposing them to content that conveyed antisocial messages. She also reiterated the  
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need for measures that would curb gangsta rap’s negative influence on black youth, like  
constructing boarding schools that would be aimed at negating black youths’ antisocial  
behavior.182 While Tucker had advanced similar arguments and proposals throughout the 1990s,  
her willingness to speak at a NOI-sponsored event centered around promoting family stability  
further reflects the consensus that black liberals and the NOI had on such an issue.  
 Black family development and its relationship to rap music was also a central theme at a  
2001 hip-hop summit organized by Simmons and the NOI. During his keynote address,  
Farrakhan implored that rappers should use their lyrics to teach black youth to respect black  




 These examples show that the NOI, like black liberals, saw gangsta rap as a major 
contributor to black antisocial behavior, and it therefore directed its efforts toward suppressing 
its influence through mentorship and moral guidance. This is not to say that such measures 
reflected a shift in the organization’s methods for dealing with black social pathology. As noted 
before, the Nation has always assumed that it could mitigate black pathology by targeting blacks’ 
supposed immorality. Yet black liberals’ embrace of this idea by way of underclass ideology and 
neoliberalism meant that black politics had generally shifted toward the right on racial matters. 
Therefore, black censorship gives us a window onto the conservative nature of black politics in 
the 1990s and 2000s. 
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 Throughout its involvement in the rap censorship movement, the NOI had hoped that 
gangsta rappers would produce content that discouraged black pathology. While many of them 
continued to make music that celebrated crime, violence, sexual promiscuity, etc., a few 
answered its clarion call. This is not to suggest that the Nation was the first to demand that 
rappers produce such music. As mentioned before, this had been an integral part of the 
NPCBW’s Entertainment Commission’s mission since its inception. Yet the few who were 
inspired by the Nation’s message would make music in this vein.  
 One of these rappers was Ice-T. Born Tracy Marrow, Ice-T was raised in South Los  
Angeles with relatives. A high school dropout and teen father, Ice-T turned to the illicit economy  
to survive, where he robbed, pimped girls and women, and sold drugs. While such subjects 
comprised the bulk of his musical output in the 1980s and early 90s, he started to produce more 
socially-conscious music by the mid-90s. In his 1996 song “I Must Stand,” for instance, he 
recounts how seeing his friends getting incarcerated convinced him to abandon his criminal 
lifestyle.184 He explains how the Million Man March inspired him to write the song:  
  That was a song where you had to be in the right place at the right time. I thought  
  at the time I had come a long way from the streets to here, and I thought to  
  myself, How did that happen?' The main message in that march is that we have  
  got to stand strong…It was a way of saying, What about you, black man? Are you 
  taking care of your family? Are you respecting your woman?”185  
 
 As further evidence of his embrace of the NOI’s message, he contributed lyrics to the 
song “Where Ya At?” which was a single released from the album One Million Strong, a 
compilation rap album that commemorated the Million Man March. Following a brief 
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commentary by rapper Ice Cube, Ice-T raps about black crime and the three-strike rule, 
suggesting that proper behavior could serve as a deterrent to prison: “brothers gonna have to put 
themselves in check/three strikes you’re in the penzo/chained to your neck.”186 
 Another rapper who took to the NOI’s message was Ice Cube. Shortly after leaving  
N.W.A. to embark on a solo career, Cube gave several interviews where he discussed the 
Nation’s influence on his thinking about black social issues. He released his second solo album  
Death Certificate in 1991. The album was divided into two halves: the “Death Side,” which  
contained songs dealing with subjects typical of gangsta rap, such as crime and sexual  
promiscuity, and the “Life Side,” which addressed more socially-conscious themes like the  
spread of sexually transmitted disease (STDs) in black communities and the ending of gang 
warfare. As explained on the album’s first track, the Death Side was a “mirror image of where 
[African Americans] are today” while the Life Side was a “vision of where we need to go.” In 
the album’s liner notes, he praised the Nation and called for blacks to join the organization.187 
 In his song “Us,” which is off the Life Side of the album, Cube faults African Americans 
for their willingness to engage in self-destructive behavior. For one, he suggests that the federal 
government is justified in cutting off welfare to black women because of rampant illegitimacy 
among them: “Four or five babies on your crotch/And you expect Uncle Sam to help us out?” He 
also explains why he felt that black men were unable to be good fathers: “I beat my wife and 
children to a pulp/ When I get drunk and smoke dope…And I'm havin' more babies than I really 
can afford/In jail 'cause I can't pay the mother.”188 
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 Both Ice-T and Cube show how gangsta rappers could produce music that was in line 
with the Nation’s censorship aims. Ice-T’s lyrics, for instance, reveals that he saw black crime 
simply as an outgrowth of bad choices that were divorced from broader political and economic 
circumstances. Cube, on the other hand, not only draws on arguments about the supposed 
connection between welfare and illegitimacy, but also scolds black men for failing to live up to  
their responsibilities as fathers. Therefore, Ice-T’s and Cube’s music speak to neoliberal 
explanations for black inequality.  
Conclusion 
 When Moynihan penned his infamous study in 1965, it was met with opposition from  
black liberals and civil rights advocates. They felt that it blamed blacks for their own plight and  
diverted attention away from structural explanations for racial inequality. Given the centrality of 
their views on racial inequality in black politics at the time, it is reasonable that Moynihan’s 
view on the subject would remain a marginal one in black politics for roughly the next two 
decades.  
 This changed during the 1990s, when neoliberalism began to cast its shadow over black  
politics. Black liberals began to believe that antisocial behavior was a major cause of black  
inequality. Because this belief had been a central idea in the Nation’s ideology since its 
inception, the organization started to gain legitimacy and take center stage in the black political 
arena during this period. Therefore, neoliberalism helped to establish a consensus between these 
two factions on the causes of black inequality in the post-civil rights era.  
 This new consensus could be seen in the Million Man March and its impact on the 
gangsta rap censorship movement. Organizers of the March expressed the view that irresponsible  
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black men were to blame for many of the social issues that blacks faced, and that black men 
could better themselves, and in turn better the conditions of blacks in general, if they practiced 
atonement, reconciliation, and responsibility. In this sense, the goals of the March were 
inextricably linked to those of the censorship movement, since the latter tended to blame major 
social issues on black male rappers and expressed the belief that they could ameliorate these 
issues by producing music that served to counter antisocial themes. Therefore, the March’s 
mission fit neatly within the purview of rap censorship.  
 Much in the same vein as black liberals, the Nation and the event it inspired (i.e. the 
Million Woman March), attempted to disrupt the supposed causal relationship between gangsta 
rap and crime, violence, sexual deviancy, and family disorganization. The Nation used mass 
gatherings and summits to call attention to the negative effects that the genre had on its black  
listeners. What separated the NOI from black liberals, however, was its more pronounced belief 
that the genre could be used as a redemptive force to cure blacks of social pathology.  
 The type of music that resulted from the Nation’s influence was music that called for 
blacks to change their behavior as a way of bettering their conditions. In Ice-T’s and Cube’s 
views, black crime and unstable black families, respectively, were products of abhorrent 












  After 2000, organized censorship efforts against gangsta rap began to decline. This does  
 not mean, however, that criticisms of the genre were any less prevalent. For many  
 commentators, in fact, rap remained a primary reason as to why blacks experienced social 
pathology at a higher rate than other groups. By looking at a few examples, we can see how 
central rap remained in discussions about social pathology. 
 One of the most vocal critics to come out of the post-censorship era was John  
McWhorter. A Columbia University linguist professor and self-described “cranky liberal  
Democrat,”189 McWhorter is a regular commentator on issues related to black culture and  
society. In 2004, he penned an essay in the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal that echoed  
arguments made by censors in the 1990s. 
In his essay, he argued that while the Civil Rights Movement created gains for African  
Americans, those gains were being undone by black antisocial behavior associated with gangsta  
rap. Asserting that the “rise of nihilistic rap has mirrored the breakdown of community norms  
among inner-city youth over the last couple of decades,” McWhorter complained that the genre  
convinces them that “there’s nothing more authentic than ghetto pathology.” He goes on to  
blame rap for encouraging conditions like violence and unemployment in black urban areas.190  
 Another prominent voice in the post-censorship era was entertainer Bill Cosby. By the  
early 2000s, Cosby had become an outspoken critic of black youth behavior. His views on the  
subject were made clear in his infamous 2004 Pound Cake speech. The speech, which was given 
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at a NAACP awards ceremony that commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Brown vs. Board  
of Education Supreme Court decision, attributed many of the challenges confronting African  
Americans in the post-civil rights era to dysfunctional behavior.  
 Centering his speech on weak family structures, Cosby argued that there was an increase  
in incarceration, high school drop-out rates, and out-of-wedlock births among young African  
Americans because black parents failed to offer their children proper moral guidance. He also  
criticized the way blacks spoke and dressed, suggesting that the former kept them out of  
professional occupations. As a nod to the NOI’s efforts to suppress black social pathology, he  
also credited the organization with crime reduction in black inner cities.191 
 While Cosby does not make any explicit references to gangsta rap in his speech, his  
written work reveals that he saw the genre as a major contributor to black social pathology. In  
2007, Cosby authored a book with noted black psychologist and longtime collaborator Dr. Alvin  
F. Poussaint that explored this very subject.192 In it, both Cosby and Poussaint assert that black  
children’s preference for broken English, which they adopt from rappers, is largely responsible  
for their high drop-out rates.193 They also argue that gangsta rap promotes the “moral breakdown  
of the family” by encouraging early pregnancy and irresponsible fathers.194 Finally, they  
recommended that black activists, institutions, organizations, and Congress do more to censor  
rap.195 
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 Like McWhorter, Cosby, and Poussaint,  Barack Obama has also attempted to find  
connections between black social pathology and rap music. In various speeches he has given  
over the years, Obama has attributed several conditions in black inner cities, such as poor  
education and other forms of “ghetto social malaise” to parental neglect.196 To address the  
high rates of unemployment, incarceration, and drop-outs rates among inner-city black males,  
Obama founded the My Brother’s Keeper (MBK) Initiative in 2014, which is aimed at helping  
“young men of color facing especially tough odds to stay on track and reach their full potential,”  
as stated in a speech outlining the goals of the program. The program seeks to help young black  
males overcome these conditions through mentorship and community leadership.197 
 Last year, Obama hosted and spoke at the first major MBK event in Oakland, California.  
Rather than addressing issues that keep poor black males from exceling in society, like  
substandard schools and a lack of employment opportunities, Obama centered his discussion on  
the need for young black men to correct their personal defects. He argued that they should reject  
notions from hip hop that aggressive behavior is somehow a marker of black male 
authenticity.198 
 While black liberals after 2000 continued to identify rap music as a major cause of black  
social pathology, the NOI continued to act as a mediator in conflicts between rap artists.  
Concerns over how the Tupac and Biggie conflict led to escalating tensions in the hip-hop world  
led Farrakhan to get involved in one of the most highly publicized rap beef in the early 2000s:  
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the 50 Cent/Ja Rule feud. While 50 claimed that the feud started after Rule saw him with a man 
who robbed him, Rule claimed that it started after 50 felt snubbed by he and his associates during 
a video shoot. Regardless of the feud’s origins, both rappers exchanged diss tracks toward one 
another from 1999-2003. Their beef started to die down after 2003, though both rappers still 
exchange insults via interviews and social media.199 
 Farrakhan sat down with Ja Rule in a 2003 interview to settle the dispute between the two 
rappers. He warned Rule to exercise caution when addressing his disputes with rappers publicly,  
since, like the Tupac and Biggie conflict, such disputes tended to contribute to violence amongst 
their fans in black communities. He hoped instead that both 50 Cent and Rule would use their 
music to uplift black youth.200  
 Farrakhan’s belief in rap’s positive impact on black youth was embodied in a central 
theme of the Millions More Movement: artistic/cultural development. Held on the ten-year  
anniversary of the Million Man March, the purpose of the Movement was to address issues that  
Farrakhan felt were not adequately addressed during the former, including black economic  
development and the government’s role in helping poor blacks. He also believed that the  
Movement could encourage black artists to “do better by themselves and by [their] people” by 
promoting positive messages.201 
 Such a call seems to have affected NOI-affiliated rapper DA Smart’s musical output. In  
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2005, he released an album titled after the Movement. In one of the album’s songs, which was 
originally released during the Million Man March, Smart rejects the welfare state and calls for  
blacks to adopt a program of self-help to better their economic conditions.  He also asserts that  
while black women had traditionally led the black family, they needed to “stay home” during  
the March and allow black men to prove their worth as husbands and fathers.202 
 Another song off the album, “The Woman,” builds on the familial themes outlined in  
Smart’s March song. He promotes a conservative role for black women in their families: he  
celebrates them as mothers and as the initial nurturers of black males. He also urges them to see 
themselves for more than their sexual prowess and act as support systems for black men.203 
 Black liberals’ and the NOI’s continued investment in behavioral solutions to black social  
issues via rap censorship did little to lessen the growing rates of school dropouts, joblessness,  
crime, and family dissolution among poor African Americans. Statistics in the post-censorship  
era, therefore, can show us why such issues can largely be understood in the context of blacks’  
economic circumstances.  
 Scholars have looked at the link between poverty and education. Russell W. Rumberger 
finds that African-American children who have a low socioeconomic status tend to have a higher 
dropout rate than their more affluent counterparts.  He posits that this is the case because the 
former often lack access to resources that are essential to academic success, such as support from 
well-educated parents who have high incomes.204 Two other scholars suggest that many poor 
black high schoolers drop out because they see paid work as a better alternative to school.205 One 
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source estimated that “[b]y the turn of the 21st century in central cities,” which tend to have high 
concentrations of poverty, the “Black male school dropout rates were 50% or more.”206 
 Like dropout rates, unemployment among African Americans could also be attributed  
to broader economic issues. One article, for instance, assessed the impact that the American  
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of  2009 had on unemployment rates among African Americans 
and Latinos living in Los Angeles and Atlanta between 2009 and 2011.207 It revealed that while  
the stimulus package was aimed at alleviating macroeconomic issues like national 
unemployment,  it did little for unemployment among blacks in these cities, which increased  
from 18.2% and 15.7% in 2009 to 25.2% and 20.7%, respectively.208 The authors suggest that 
the rate increased because the package failed to address the microeconomic issues associated 
with minorities in these areas, such as being geographically isolated from good-paying jobs.209 
 In 2018, Earl Fredrick published an article in the Harvard Public Health Review that  
looked at how poverty contributed to homicide rates in predominately black Chicago 
neighborhoods between 2005 and 2009. He found that there were higher instances of homicide in  
neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. Englewood and West Englewood, which were 46.6%  
and 34.4% below the poverty line, respectively, annually had on average 22 and 18 homicides,  
respectively. Conversely, he notes that affluent white Chicago neighborhoods, like Lakeview and  
O’ Hare, reported only one murder annually during the same years.210 
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 These statistics should not suggest that poor blacks are somehow predisposed to violent,  
criminal behavior. There are often external factors that can be used to explain such behavior.  
Sociologist Elijah Anderson, for instance, examines how joblessness contributes to crime and  
violence. He argues that black youth that come from poor, deindustrialized urban areas where  
joblessness is common are often forced to partake in the illicit economy for economic gain. In  
this context, committing crimes and acts of violence, which would normally be considered   
deviations from mainstream norms, are viewed as legitimate forms of work.211 
 Black family instability can also be tied to economic deprivation. One 2019 report  
evaluated the state of education and employment for black families that resided in poor, low-  
income areas in Atlanta. The report found that parents are often not able to send their children to  
good childcare programs in the city because of the high cost. In 2016, for instance, the average  
annual cost for these programs in Georgia was $7, 644, which made up nearly 30% of these  
families’ annual median household income. The report also asserted that this not only retards  
children’s academic success, but also contributes to parents’ unemployment, since they might  
have no one to look after their young children while they are at work or look for work.212 This  
increases the likelihood that parents will participate in the illicit economy, and therefore become  
incarcerated and leave their children neglected. This shows that such conditions cannot be solely  
attributed to pathology. 
 Censors’ preference for behavioral approaches to black social issues despite evidence that 
such issues are linked to economic conditions shows how black rap censorship was the triumph 
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of neoliberalism in black politics. Black liberals pursued censorship to address the myriad of 
social issues that blacks faced in the post-WWII era. The measures they utilized toward this end 
were based on a belief that such issues were the product of behavioral issues rather than a dearth 
of economic opportunities, which is why they sought to reduce crime through mentorship rather 
than job creation, or identified immorality as a central cause of black family breakdown. The 
NOI’s censorship efforts were also reflective of a neoliberal turn in black politics. The Nation 
never adopted neoliberalism per se, since the organization has always been conservative in racial 
matters. Yet both black liberals’ and the NOI’s acceptance of behavioral solutions to black social 
issues meant that they reached a consensus on the causes of black inequality in contemporary 
society. This consensus must be seen in the same context as the anti-crime and welfare reform 
measures of the 1990s, since they all reflected similar assumptions about black crime, female 
sexual deviancy, and family life. By looking at black censorship in this context, it can be seen 
that it was a facet of a broader rightward shift in black and American politics, and not so much a 
cultural or generational issue as some scholars suggest. 
 In making this argument, this project does not seek to condemn censors for their choice 
of politics. Rather, I argue that their politics were understandable given the historical context. 
The political narrative among censors and their contemporaries was that civil rights and 
affirmative action policies had led to significant gains for blacks, and their failure to take 
advantage of the opportunities brought about by these policies were reflective of their own 
shortcomings. Therefore, their approach to dealing with black social issues did not so much 
reflect a retreat from their commitment to black equality but more so the means they believed it 
took to achieve it-changing individual behavior rather than broader structural forces. Therefore, 
censors are a product of their historical moment. 
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 While it is not my goal to vilify black rap censorship and neoliberal politics, this project 
should nevertheless caution social scientists, politicians, policymakers, and the general 
population about using behavioral measures as a panacea for major black social issues. This is  
not to suggest that behavior does not sometime play a role in personal outcomes: some people  
commit crimes and form broken families due to moral depravity. But this is true of everyone, and  
it fails to explain why poor blacks suffer from these conditions at a disproportionally higher rate  
than other groups. Because such behavioralist explanations do not suffice, we must instead look  
to their peculiar historical experience: deindustrialization, automation, globalization, and the  
federal government’s refusal to address the effects that these economic changes had on black  
urban life. Such an analysis sheds light on how large-scale social issues cannot simply be by- 
products of personal immorality; broader political-economic factors can often constrain the type  
of opportunities that a group has, which can lead to these conditions.  
 Finally, this project should show that neoliberal politics have not been up to the task of  
improving the conditions of poor, urban blacks. Any politics that fail to acknowledge the toll that  
political-economic forces have had on their communities must be discarded. In rejecting such  
politics, we can conclude that we must instead advance politics that effectively address the  
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